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THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY 
IN 1riE PE~TNSYL VANIA CONSTITUTION 
by Seth F. Kreirner· 
I. SETTING THE SCENE 
As a law professor, let me begin with a hypotheticaL Imagine 
a smaH city in Pennsylvania with a mayor and city council who are 
enamored of traditional family values. The city elders feel 
themse!,;es to be under siege from the outside world; their feelings 
are exacerbated when one day the local newspaper runs a story on 
the sexual practices of the youth of the city. According to the 
newspaper, a number of the young male residents of the town are 
engaged in heterosexual activities reminiscent of the Spur Posse in 
California. 1 Moreover, the article recounts the existence of a 
flourishing and sexually active gay and lesbian sub-culture 
emerging in the town-albeit behind closed doors. 
Let us suppose that the city administration decides to take 
action against these activities in a fashion that does not require 
involvement of the criminal justice system. First, the mayor issues 
an "administrative request for information" purporting to 
command the three pharmacies in the city to provide the mayor 
with records of the sales of all condoms and other contraceptives 
over the last three years, along with the identity of the purchasers. 
~Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania; J.D., Yale Law School. 
This Article has benefited from the comments of Ken Gormley, David 
Rudovsky, and Bob Williams. My grateful acknowledgement of their help 
should subject them to no biame for any mistakes that remain. 
1 Tbe Spur Posse is a group of males at Lakewood High School in 
California who allegedly engaged in promiscuous sex with and raped female 
fellow students , while keeping "score" of their victims. See Seth Mydans, High 
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The reporting requirement imposed on doctors under federal 
doctrit1e is not a search or seizure of tangible objects, but simply 
a demand for illionnation and, therefore, outside of the Fourth 
J-\Jnendment . Nor are the protections of privacy under substantive 
due process li..l.cely to provide a federal shield. Although federal 
case law has developed protections for certain intimate sexual 
activities truough a series of "zones of privacy" rooted i11 the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, homosexual 
encounters have been held to fall outside of these zones. 5 These 
days, even the protected areas are shielded only against "undue 
burdens. "6 In its only encounter with similar problems, the United 
States Supreme Court in lvtuzlen v. Roe refused to establish a right 
of medical anonymity, and upheld New York' s requirement that 
doctors and pharmacists be required to report prescriptions of 
certain drugs to a central state computer flle. 7 Justice Stevens 
commented, for a unanimous Court, that "disclosures of private 
medical information to doctors, to hospital personnel, to insurance 
companies, and to public health agencies are often an essential part 
of modem medical practice. "8 
States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442 (1976) (stating that there is no legitimate 
expectation of privacy in financial records voluntarily conveyed to a bank). 
5 Bowers v . Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986). 
6 Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992). Casey struck down 
a requirement that women report their impending abortions to their husbands. 
Further, Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417 (1990), seems to have retained 
a right of minors who seek judicial aid in bypassing parental consent 
requirements to have their identities shielded from public dissemination, even if 
they have no right to seek aid anonymously. These seeds might sprout into a 
federal recogilltion that to publicize use of contraceptives constitutes an "undue 
burden" upon the rights of adults and minors. Whether simply reporting these 
activities to municipal authorities is an "undue burden" is a closer question. 
7 429 U.S. 589, 602-03 (1977). 
8 Jd. at 602. Whalen was premised, in part, on the fact that the New York 
system provided that the records were to be confidential. The lower federal 
courts have discerned from Whalen and a few other cases a federal right to the 
confidentiality of information regarding intimate activities that must be balanced 
against the magnitude of the government interest at stake. See Seth F. Kreimer , 
Sunlight, Secrets, and Scarlet Letters: The Tension Between Privacy and 
Disclosure in ConstitutionalLmv, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 120-21, 137-39 (1991) 
(reviewing cases illustrative of this point) . 
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Fearing the mayor's wrath, the phannacies would comply. Second, 
the city council adopts an ordinance requiring all doctors in the 
city to report to the mayor's office any instance of homosexual 
activity or unwed pregnancy that comes to their attention . Third , 
using the information gathered from both the pharmacies and the 
doctors, the mayor publishes a list of "known homosexuals" and 
"known sexual profligates." Hoping that public opinion vv ill be 
brought to bear to stifle the offending conduct, the mayor claims 
as well that the list will enable residents to shield themselves from 
the threat of AIDS. 
Each of these actions--the demand for phannacy infonnation , 
the requirement of doctor reporting, and the publication of the 
list-seems on its face to be an invasion of the right to privacy, 
which, according to Justice Brandeis, is "the right most valued by 
civilized men. 112 Taken together, the mayor' s actions erect a 
structure of governmental control that is toxic to a sense of 
freedom: a kind of cross between The Scarlet Letter "on the 
Susquehanna" and Orwell's 1984 in 1993. But taken either alone 
or together, there is only an outside chance that the actions violate 
the guarantees of the United States Constitution as currently 
construed. 
Under current federal doctrine, although the pharmacies can 
object to the mayor's demand, there is no violation of the 
customer's Fourth Amendment rights if a pharmacy chooses to 
acquiesce. The governing theory is that in order to constitute an 
unconstitutional search or seizure a government action must violate 
a "reasonable expectation of privacy. 113 Once the information is 
shared with others-in this case the pharmacy-there can be no 
reasonable expectation of privacy by the customers . 4 
2 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S . 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., 
dissenting); see also Commonwealth v. Edmunds, 586 A.2d 887, 898 (Pa. 
1991); Denoncourt v. Pennsylvania State Ethics Comm' n, 470 A.2d 945, 948 
(Pa. 1983). 
3 See, e.g., Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U .S. 602 
(1989) (discussing "reasonable expectations of privacy") ; Katz v. United States, 
389 U.S. 247 (1967). 
4 See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 , 743-44 (1979) (stating that there 
is no reasonable expectation of privacy in phone numbers calied because the 
numbers were "voluntarily turned over" to the telephone company); Uni ted 
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The flnal act, dissemination of the data acquired by the city 
administration, might seem to be a "deprivation of liberty " ·without 
due process, because it affixes a potentially stigmatizing brand to 
individuals without notice or hearing . The current United States 
Supreme Court doctrine, however, holds that injury to reputation 
by the govem.rnent cannot constitute a "deprivation of liberty" 
unless 'it changes the citizen 's legal status. 9 In Paul v. Davis , the 
Court held that it was not a ''deprivation of liberty" to place a 
citizen on a Hst of known shoplifters; 10 it is hard to predict a 
different answer for a Est of kno·wn homosexuals or sexual 
profligates. 11 
Thus, as currently constmed, the United States Constitution 
provides very limited protection against this kind of an assault on 
privacy. The question I will address is whether the Pennsylvania 
Constitution fares any better. 12 
9 Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 710-12 (1976). 
10 ld. at 712; if. Siegert v. Gilley, 111 S. Ct. 1789, 1794 (1991) 
(reaffirming Paul). 
11 Sunlight, Secrets, and Scarlet Letters makes the case under federal law for 
some additional protection of "intimate" information. Kreimer, supra note 8, at 
137-38. 
12 For reviews of the privacy protection provided under other state 
constitutions, see, e.g., John Devlin, Privacy and Abortion Rights Under the 
Louisiana State Constitution: Could Roe v. Wade Be Alive and Well in the 
Bayou State?, 51 LA. L. REv. 685 (1991); Ken Gormley, One Hundred Years 
of Privacy, 1992 WIS . L. REv. 1335, 1420-31 ; Ken Gormley & Rhonda G. 
Hartman, Privacy and the States, 65 TEMP. L. REv. 1279 (1992); J. Clark 
Kelso, California's Constitutional Right to Privacy, 19 PEPP. L. REv. 327 
(1992); Mark Silverstein, Privacy Rights in State Constitutions: Models for 
Illinois?, 1989 U. ILL. L. REv. 215; Timothy Stailcup, Comment, "The Arizona 
Constitutional "Right to Privacy" and the btvasion of Privacy Tort, 241L~iZ . ST. 
L.J. 687 (1992). For a discussion of one aspect of privacy protection in 
Pennsylvania, see Richard C. Turkington, Legal Protection for the 
Confidentiality of Health Care lnfomwtion in Pennsylvania: Patient ani Client 
Access,· Testimonial Privileges; Damage Recovery for Unauthorized E'l.-tra-Legal 
Disclosure, 32 VILL. L. REv. 259 (1987). 
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ll . SEA..l{CHES, SEIZURES, AND EXPECTATIONS : SAt-/fE TEXT, 
DIFFERENT ErviPHASIS 
81 
Let us begin with the demand for phannacists' records. Like 
the Fourth .Amendment, Article I , Section 8 of the Pe:rmsylvania 
Constitution provides explicit protection against unreasonable 
searches and seizures. It provides that "[t]he people shall be secure 
in their persons, houses, papers and possessions from urrre..asonable 
searches and seizures, and no warrant to search any place or to 
seize any person or things shall issue without describii1g them as 
:nearly as may be, nor v.;ithout probable cause." i 3 
As a matter of ordinary use of language, an official demand 
for medical records certainly seems as if it could be a search or 
seizure. Under federal law, however, it is not. In United States v. 
!vfiller, 14 the United States Supreme Court held that a bank 
customer had no reasonable expectation of privacy in his bank 
records. According to the Court, "[t]he depositor ta...lces the risk, in 
revealing his affairs to another , that the infonnation will be 
conveyed by that person to the Government." 15 
Although there are minor textual differences between 
Pennsylvania's Article I, Section 816 and the Fourth Amendment, 
the operative phrases "persons, houses, papers," "unreasonable 
searches and seizures," and "probable cause," and the tenn 
"warrants" are identical. 17 Nonetheless, for the past fifteen years, 
the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has been willing to deviate 
from the United States Supreme Court's search and seizure 
13 PA. CONST. art. I, § 8. 
14 425 u.s. 435 (1976). 
15 Jd. at 443 (citing United States v. White, 4.01 U.S. 745, 751-52 (1971)). 
16 Section X of the 1776 Declaration of Rights differed more extensively 
from the Fourth Amendment. It provided: "That the people have a right to hold 
themselves, their houses, papers and possessions fre-..e from search and seizure, 
and therefore warrants, without oaths or affirmations first made, affording a 
sufficient foundation for them . .. ought not to be granted . " PA. CONST. of 
1776, ch. I (Dec!. of Rights), § 10. The adoption in 1790 of Article IX, Section 
8, however , largely paralleled the federal version. The 1790 provision has 
remained unchanged to the present. 
17 The difference between "possessions" and "effects" is a bit slim to form 
the basis for any doctrinal structure. 
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jurisprudence in enforcing Article I, Section 8. ~fhe Pennsylvania 
courts, in constming this provision, have made their determination 
based both on their own readings of the practical demands and 
potential for abuse in particular policies, and on the belief that 
Article I, Section 8 is "tied into the implicit 1ight to privacy in this 
Commonwealth" t8-thus allowing state courts to give more 
weight to the demands of individual privacy than the federal courts 
give in parallel circumstances . 
Pennsylvania courts have long declined to view Article I, 
Section 8 as a disembodied command , but rather have approached 
it as part of a fabric of protections for privacy encompassing the 
18 Commonwealth v. DeJohn, 403 A.2d 1283, 1291 (Pa. 1979) (citation 
omitted); see, e.g., Commonwealth v. Martin, 626 A.2d 556, 563 (Pa. 1993) 
(Cappy, J., concurring) (relying on "human dignity and privacy so preciously 
preserved by our founding fathers" and an "unwavering belief in the sanctity and 
integrity of personal privacy" to interpret Article I, Section 8); Commonwealth 
v. Edmunds, 586 A.2d 887, 897 (Pa. 1991) (stating that Article I, Section 8 "is 
meant to embody a strong notion of privacy, carefully safeguarded in this 
Commonwealth for the past two centuries"); Lunderstadt v . Pennsylvania House 
of Representatives , 519 A.2d 408, 414 (Pa. 1986) (quoting DeJohn, 403 A.2d 
at 1283). 
Earlier Pennsylvania cases often relied on federal precedents protecting 
"privacies of life" under the Fourth Amendment to interpret Article I, Section 
8. See, e.g., Annenberg v. Roberts, 2 A.2d 612, 617 (Pa. 1938) (relying on 
Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 621 (1886), to interpret Article I, Section 
8). Although the protection provided for privacy at the federal level has waned, 
Pennsylvania courts have often retained the earlier and more protective federal 
rules. Lunderstadt, 519 A.2d at 413-15 (relying on Annenberg despite the 
narrowing of federal protections); cf Edmunds, 586 A.2d at 887 (declining to 
adopt the federal innovation of the good faith exception to the exclusionary 
rule); Commonwealth v. Sell , 470 A.2d 457 (Pa. 1983) (refusing to follow the 
federal substitution of "expectation of privacy" for "automatic standing" to assert 
violations of search and seizure guarantees). 
Article I, Section 8 was revised in 1790 to a text that more closely parallels 
the words of the Fourth Amendment. Thus, there may be some reason to give 
weight to federal interpretation in the Fourth Amendment arena. Still, when the 
state court is confronted with two inconsistent federal precedents, there is no 
particular reason to believe that the later one is the "true" interpretation that the 
state court should follow. The state court can honor the parallelism of state and 
federal wording by choosing the more protective federal interpretation, rather 
than the most recent one. 
• 
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"inherent and indefeasible rights" protected by Article I, Section 
1, the common law, and the Fomth Amendment. 19 In weaving this 
fabric, Pennsylvania's courts have relied on the insights under one 
constitutional provision to give texture to cognate rights. Thus, in 
interpreting Article I, Section 8's protection against searches and 
seizures, the Pennsylv·ania Supreme Court in Conzmonwealth v. 
E.dmunds20 relied on the commitment to ptivacy expressed in 
Denoncourt v. Commonwealth, State Ethics Commission, 21 a case 
that interpreted Article I, Section 1 as protecting against 
regulations requiring financial disclosures by public officials. 22 
Denoncourt, in tum, cited precedent under Article I, Section 8 to 
illuminate the meaning of Article I, Section 1. 23 l\!Iore recently, in 
construing the right to privacy under Article I, Section 1, the 
Supreme Comt of Pennsylvania has taken into account both Article 
I, Section 8 and Pennsylvania's common-law protection of the 
19 E.g., Commonwealth v. Murray, 223 A.2d 102, 109-10 (Pa. 1966) 
(Musmanno, J.) (plurality opinion) (stating that the right to privacy is rooted in 
the Article I, Section 1 protection of "inherent and indefeasible rights" and in 
Article I, Section 8); id. at 112 (Roberts, J., concurring) (stating that "(a] 
jealous regard for individual privacy is a judicial tradition of distinguished 
origin, buttressed in many areas by the imperative mandate of constitutional 
guarantees"); Commonwealth v. Palms, 15 A.2d 481 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1940). 1l1e 
Palms court 
recognized the power and duty of the state to take steps to ... protect 
the privacy . . . of its inhabitants. Centuries before freedom of 
conscience and freedom of speech were established in England it was 
the proud boast of an Englishman that his home was his castle . . . . 
That right is implied in both our Federal and State Constitutions .... 
!d. at 485; see also Annenberg, 2 A. 2d at 617. The court in Annenberg stated: 
ld. 
It would seem scarcely necessary to marshal authorities to establish, 
as a proposition of constitutional law, that a witness cannot be 
compelled, under the guise of a legislative study . . . to reveal his 
private and personal affairs, except to the extent to which such 
disclosure is reasonably required for the general purpose of the 
inquiry. 
21
) Edmunds, 586 A.2d at 897. 
21 470 A.2d 945 (Pa. 1983). 
22 Jd. at 946. 
23 Id. at 948-49 (citing Commonwealth v. DeJohn, 403 A.2d 1283 (Pa. 
1979); Annenberg, 2 A.2d 612 (Pa. 1938)) . 
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right to privacy . 24 This is nm a blurring of C3.tegories, but a 
recognition that the constitution of our Commonwealth embodies 
a commitment to principles that manifest themselves in a coherent 
pattem of protection of individual p rivacy . The Supreme Court of 
Pennsylvania has thus retained what the United States Supreme 
Court suggested in Griswold v. Connecticur ,25 but has largely set 
to one side. Pennsylvania' s j urispmdence seeks to acknmvledge the 
C•Jr1sta11t "gravitation£-11 pull n of tf1e ~dea ! of pti .. vacy in a variety of 
areas. 26 
Over the past decade and a half , the Supreme Court of 
Pennsylvania has rejected federal precedents regarding automatic 
24 Stenger v. Lehigh Valley Hosp . Ctr., 609 A.2d 796, 800-02 (Pa. 1992) 
(citing Vogel v. W.T . Grant Co., 327 A.2d 133 (Pa. 1974) as well as se?..rch 
and seizure cases) (holding that the right to privacy as a matter of tort law had 
been "firmly established"); John M. v. Paula T. , 571 A.2d 1380 (Pa. 1990) 
(citing Vogel, 327 A.2d 133 (Pa. 1974)). 
The clearest example of this approach is seen in the opinion of Justice 
Mandarino in In reB., 394 A.2d 419, 424 (Pa. 1978). That opinion relied on 
the recognition of a general "right of privacy" in Pennsylvania's tort law as a 
part of "American jurisprudence" to ground a constitutional right to prevent 
disclosure of information revealed to a psychotherapist. !d. at 424-25. Justice 
Mandarino quoted the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in In re Mack, 126 A.2d 
679 (Pa. 1956). 
"The court below, as are all courts, was charged with a duty to 
protect the right of privacy of the prisoner. It cannot be doubted that 
the prisoner was powerless to do so by any means within his control; 
and in such case the court has an inherent duty to use all reasonable 
means to safeguard that right." 
In reB., 394 A.2d at 425 (quoting In re Mack, 126 A.2d at 683). 
Pennsylvania's common-law right to privacy was earlier recognized in 
Thomas v . Brohm, 47 A.2d 244, 245 (Pa. 1946) (declining to grant a judgment 
for defendants in a case alleging violation of a woman's right to privacy during 
labor); and Waring v. WDAS Broadcasting Station, 194 A. 631 (Pa. 1937) 
(Maxey, J., concurring) (recognizing right to privacy against eavesdropping and 
unconsented observation). 
25 381 U .S. 479 (1965) (striking down a statutory prohibition of the use of 
birth control because it would require a search of the marital bedroom). 
26 For discussions of the "gravitational force" of legal principles in one area 
of the law on interpretation in other areas, see, e.g., GUIDO CALABRESI, A 
CO!V1MON LAW FOR T HE AGE OF STATUTES 85-86 (1982); R . DWORKIN, TAKING 
RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 113-24 (1 978). 
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standing to assert search and seizure violations, 27 the good faith 
exception to the wauant requirement, 28 the requirement that the 
state obtain waiTants before placing pen registers, 29 the scope of 
legislative investigations, 30 cL'ld the status of drug-sniffing dogs as 
searches. 31 
Although Pennsylvania's emerging constitutional jurisprudence 
under Article I, Section 8 manifests a heightened interest in 
privacy, it does not reject the framework of federal search and 
seizure doctrine and start from scratch. The basic issues of 
probable cause and reasonable expectations of privacy are framed 
in tenns similar to those used by federal courts. 32 The state 
27 Commonwealth v. Sell, 470 A.2d 457 (Pa. 1983). 
"" Commonwealth v. Edmunds, 586 A.2d 887 (Pa. 1991). 
29 Corn.monwealth v. Melilli, 555 A.2d 1254 (Pa. 1989). 
30 Lunderstadt v. Permsylvania House of Representatives, 519 A.2d 408,_415 
(Pa. 1986) (requiring probable cause to believe that records sought by legislative 
subpoena contain evidence of civil or criminal wrongdoing; rejecting federal 
case law that legislative subpoenas may be issued upon a lesser showing). 
31 Commonwealth v. Martin, 626 A.2d 556 (Pa. 1993) (rejecting the federal 
ruie and requiring probable cause and a warrant before drug sniff of a person); 
Commonwealth v. Johnston, 530 A.2d 74 (Pa. 1987) (rejecting federal 
determination that a drug sniff was not a search and requiring articulable 
suspicion before a dmg sniff of property). 
32 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Blystone, 549 A.2d 81, 87 (Pa. 1988) 
(relying on the "reasonable expectation" analysis established in Katz v. United 
States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), in constming Article I, Section 8); see also 
Conm10nwealth v. Copenhefer, 587 A.2d 1353 (Pa. 1991) (holding that the Katz 
"reasonable expectation of privacy" was not present in computer files that the 
defendant attempted to delete); Commonwealth, Dep't of Envtl. Resources v. 
Biosenski Disposal Serv., 566 A.2d 845, 850 (Pa. 1989) (stating that an Article 
I, Section 8 analysis of the "heaviiy regulated industries" exception to warrant 
requirement is the same as in the Fourth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution); Commonwealth v. Gray, 503 A.2d 921 (Pa. 1986) (adopting the 
federal "totality of circumstances" analysis with respect to probable cause under 
Article I , Section 8). 
In Commonwealth v. Oglialoro, 579 A.2d 1288 (Pa. 1990), the court 
seemed to accept the proposition that a helicopter flying fifty feet off the ground 
over a house was not a "search," unless the helicopter endangered the persons 
below. The court founded its decision in the Fourth Amendment, but made no 
reference to the Penmylvania Constitution. Commonwealth v. Brundidge, 620 
A.2d 1115 (Pa. 1993), refers to both the Fourth Amendment and Pennsylvania's 
86 WIDENER JOURNAL OF PUBLlC LAW [Vol. 3 
courts , however, undertake the responsibility to strike its 
accommodation independently among competing concerns in light 
of Pennsylvania's constitutional commitment to a "strong notion of 
privacy. "33 
Most relevant for the analysis of our hypothetical mayor ' s 
actions is Commonwealth v. DeJohn?1 In that case, the Supreme 
Court of Pennsylvania, with only Justice Larsen dissenting, 
rejected the reasoning of the United States Supreme Court in 
United States v. lvfiller 5 regarding demands for bank records . 
Article I , Section 8. Brundidge relied on Oglialoro and Katz to conclude that 
there is no legitimate expe.:tation of privacy in a hotel room afte r the check-out 
time, but that there is such an expectation in "discrete a.,!d concealed personal 
effects " left in sealed containers for a short time after check-out . !d. at 1118. 
33 Commonwealth v. Edmunds , 586 A.2d 887, 896 , 898 (Pa. 199 1); see, 
e.g., Commonwealth v. Sell, 470 A.2d 457, 467 (Pa. 1983) (stating that "the 
survival of the language now employed in Ar ticle L Section 8 through over 200 
years of profound change . . . demonstrates . . . the paramount concern for 
privacy"). Thus, Commonwealth v. Kohl, 615 A.2d 308 (Pa. 1992), which 
stmck down warrantless dmg tests of drivers, seemed to diverge from the 
balancing approach adopted by the United States Supreme Court in its drug 
testing cases. Further, Commonwealth v. Rodriquez, 614 A.2d 1378 (Pa. 1992), 
declined to balance away protections against personal seizures in the vicinity of 
a searched premises. 
Commonwealth v. Blouse, 611 A.2d i177 (Pa. 1992), in evaluating 
warrantless road blocks, seemed to have adopted a "balancing" approach 
analogous to the federal analysis , albeit a balance that is stmck i..1.dependent of 
the speci fie outcomes of federal precedent. Blouse also imposed requirements 
of administrative authorization for roadblocks that do not flow from federal law. 
See also Commonwealth v. Tarbert, 535 A .2d 1035 , 1042 (1987) (stating that 
the court undertakes its inquiry "with the caveat that the privacy interest 
guaranteed by Article I, Section 8 must be accorded great weight"). 
When the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania finds in favor of defendants on 
contestable Fourth Amendment grounds , it often undertakes a parallel 
"suspenders and belt" state constitutional analysis to preserve ''independent state 
grounds" and to immunize its determination against federal review . See, e.g., 
Commonwealth v . Kohl, 615 A.2d 308 (Pa. 1992) (invalidating "implied 
consent" to blood testing under both federal and state constitutions because of 
a lack of probable cause requirement); Commonwealth v. Rodriquez, 614 A.2d 
1378 (Pa. 1992) (holding that detention violated both the Fourth Amendment and 
Article I, Section 8). 
34 403 A.2d 1283 (Pa. 1979). 
35 425 U.S. 435 (1976) (holding a depositor does not have a protected 
• 
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The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania viewed the Miller approach 
as "a dangerous precedent, with great potential for abuse. "36 It 
sensibly repudiated the proposition that an individual's expectation 
of privacy is a bursting bubble like an evidentiary privilege that 
dissipates on emerging from total isolation.37 Instead, our court 
adopted the California Supreme Court's reasoning that a 
customer's disclosure to the bank for the limited purpose of 
"facilitat[ing] the conduct of his financial affairs, "38 did not waive 
an expectation of privacy with regard to further exposure to 
government searches and seizures. 39 
Just as the bank customer in DeJohn supplied information to 
the bank "upon the reasonable assumption that the inforrnation 
(would] remain confidential, "40 the customers of the pharmacists 
in. the hypothetical might reasonably rely on the discretion of their 
druggists. 41 Thus, under the Pennsylvania Constitution, the fact 
privacy interest in the records of depositor's account that the bank is required 
to monitor under the Bank Secrecy Act). 
36 DeJohn, 403 A.2d at 1289. 
37 !d. 
38 !d. at 1290 (quoting Burrows v. Superior Court of San Bernardino 
County, 13 Cal. 3d 238, 247 (1974)). 
39 ld. 
40 !d. 
41 The issue is, however, not cut and dried. In Commonwealth v. Blystone, 
549 A.2d 81 (Pa. 1988), the court accepted the United States Supreme Court's 
conclusion in United States v. White, 401 U.S. 741 (1979), that recording of a 
conversation by a party to the conversation was not a search or seizure because 
"a thing remains secret until it is told to other ears, after which one cannot 
command its keeping." Blystone, 549 A.2d at 87. This holding is in some 
tension with the recognition in DeJohn that disclosure to a single individual for 
one purpose is not tantamount to a waiver of the expectation of privacy for all 
purposes. 
Blystone may be reconcilable with DeJohn. DeJohn rested on the court's 
acceptance as "reasonable" the customers' assumption that banks would retain 
information as confidential. In Blystone, the court may simply have viewed a 
similar expectation of prison acquaintances as not equally reasonable, 
p<1.rticularly because the Pennsylvania legislature had specifically approved 
"participant monitoring" by law enforcement officers in specified circumstances. 
This analysis fmds support in Commonwealth v. Melilli, 555 A.2d 1254, 1258-
59 (Pa. 1989), in which the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania relied on DeJohn 
(with only Justice McDermott dissenting) to reject the United States Supreme 
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that the mayor sought to obtain private information from third 
parties did not divest him of constitutional constraints . \Vhether 
consumers' "expectation of privacy" in pharnncist 's records is as 
reasonable as that, ce.rtai:1ly their expectations in bank records 
would be the nub of the discussion uncl:::r the Pennsylvania 
Constitution. 
III. REPUTATION, INFORMATION, AND PRtVA.CY: DfFFEREi\TT 
TEXT, DIFFERENT COMi\IITTl\tiENTS 
Let us now tum to the doctor reporting requirement. Initially, 
it is harder to define a statutor.t.ly required report as either a search 
or seizure, so the constraints of J-\rticle I, Section 8 may not be 
directly relevant. 42 The courts of Pennsylvania have emphasized, 
Court's position in Smith v. Maryland , 442 U.S. 735 (1979), that sharing the 
phone number one dials with the telephone company waives any expectation of 
privacy vis-a-vis government "pen registers." 
The question in this analysis thus becomes whether a pharmacy is more like 
a bank and a telephone company, or like a personal acquaintance in terms of the 
"reasonableness" of an expectation of privacy. One element that has caught the 
attention of the court seems to be the degree of intmsion of the search into 
bodily privacy or intimate activities. More intrusive searches are generally less 
likely to be judged reasonable. Commonwealth v. Martin, 626 A.2d 556 (Pa. 
1993); Comn10nwealth v. Kohl, 615 A.2d 308 (Pa. 1992); Commonwealth v. 
Kean, 556 A.2d 374, 380-82 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989) .. 
A second relevant factor is the extent of the infonnation gathered. In 
DeJohn, the court emphasized the vulnerability of privacy to "one stop 
shopping" by law enforcement officers who couid uncover a virtually complete 
biography by obtaining fmancial records; more targeted searches might be 
considered more reasonable. 
Third, the "reasonableness" of reliance on confidentiality might turn on the 
degree to which that reliance is effectiveiy compelled. The court might have 
distinguished Blystone because the "realities of modern life" do not effectively 
require personal confidences in the same way that they require dependence on 
banks and teiephones. This, however, suggests some odd psychology: sharing 
with friends seems to be at least as much a psychological necessity as reliance 
on banks is a financial necessity. 
42 But see John M. v. Paula T., 571 A.2d 1385, 1386 (Pa. 1990) 
(characterizing the court's requirement of a paternity test as a11 "unreasonable 
search and seizure"); Lunderstadt v. Pennsylvania House of Representatives, 519 
A.2d 408, 413 (Pa. 1986) (treating a legislative subpoena as a violation of 
• 
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however, that Pennsylvania's search and seizure protections are 
part of a broader commitment to privacy. Courts refer to other 
elements of Pennsylvania 's constitutional scheme on this point, 
using the privacy protected by Section 8 as a 1andmark. 43 
Pennsylvania lacks the explicit constitutional language 
regarding privacy contained in some other state constitutions. 44 
However, Article I, Section 1 provides that "[a]ll men are born 
equally free and independent, and have certain inherent and 
indefeasib le rights, among which are those of enjoying and 
defending life and liberty, of acquir ing, possessing and protecting 
property and reputation, and of pursuing their own happiness . "45 
This seems like a promising opening, as it contains a textual 
recognition of "inherent and indefeasible rights" accruing to all, 
which include, but extend beyond "life," "liberty," "property, " and 
"-puu~a+ion " ! v, l <- L• · -· 
There may be some temptation to read this broad, natural 
rights la..11guage as merely "descriptive rather than normative," 
setting forth "principles of government" that are not subject to 
judicial enforcement. 46 The structure, context, and judicial 
Article I, Section 8); Annenberg v. Roberts, 2 A.2d 612, 617 (Pa. 1938) 
(same). 
43 See supra notes 19-23; Barasch v. Pennsylvania Pub . Utils. Comm'n, 576 
A.2d 79 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1990), aff'd on other grounds, 605 A.2d 1198 (1992) 
(referring to Article I, Section 1 and Section 8 as bases for privacy). 
44 During the 1970s, a number of states incorporated broad and free-standing 
guarantees of privacy into their state constitutions. See, e.g., ALASKA CONST. 
art. I, § 22; CAL. CONST. art. I, § 1; FLA. CONST. art. I, § 23; HAW. CONST. 
art. I, § 6; MONT. CONST. art. II, § 10. Between 1968 and 1974, a number of 
states also amended their search and seizure provisions to include protections 
against invasions of privacy. See, e.g., HAW. CONST. art. I, § 7; ILL. CONST. 
art. I, § 6; LA. CONST. art. I, § 5; S.C. CONST. art. I, § 10. The original turn-
of-the-century constitutions of Arizona and Washington guaranteed a right for 
one not to be "disturbed in his private affairs ... without authorization of law." 
See ARIZ. CONST. art. II , § 8; WASH. CONST. art. I, § 7; Gormley & Hartman, 
supra note 12, at 1282-83. 
45 PA. CONST. art. I , § 1. 
46 Gormley & Hartman, supra note 12, at 1282-83 (internal quotations 
omitted); see also Robert F. Williams, Equality Guarantees in State 
ConstiturionalLaw, 63 TEx. L. REV. 1195, 1205 (1985) (citing Grad, The State 
Bill of Rights, in CON-CON: IssUES FOR THE ILLINOIS CONSTITUTIONAL 
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construction of Article I, Section 1, however, point in the opposite 
direction. 
The "equally free and independent" language originally 
appeared as the fust section of the Declaration of Rights of 
Pennsylvania's 1776 constitution. Section 46 of the 1776 Frame of 
Government provided that the Declaration of Rights was to be "a 
part of the constitution of this commonwealth [that] ought never to 
be violated on any pretence whatsoever. "47 
Pennsylvania's 1790 constitution included a slightly modified 
version of the 1776 "equally free and independent" section as the 
first section of its Declaration of Rights. 48 Tne 1790 constitution 
added an express statement that "[t]o guard against transgressions 
of the high powers which we have delegated, we declare that every 
thing in this article is excepted out of the general powers of 
govemment, and shall for ever remain inviolate. "49 No distinction 
was made between the flrst section and the rest of the Declaration 
of Rights with regard to inviolability. Both the reference to 
"inherent and indefeasible rights" and the establishment of 
inviolability have been retained in identical language m every 
subsequent Pennsylvania Constitution. 50 
At its inception, Pennsylvania shared the "equally free and 
independent" provision with the constitutions oflVIassachusetts and 
CONVENTION 30, 34 (V. Ranney eel. 1970)). Professor Williams acknowledged, 
however, that courts have in fact enforced the "equally free and independent" 
clauses of state constitutions. /d. at 1219. 
47 PA. CaNST. of 1776, ch. II (Frame of Gov't), § 46. Section 47 of the 
1776 Frame of Government provided for the establishment of a "council of 
censors" to review the constitutionality of actions of the legislative and executive 
branches. !d. § 47. 
48 In contrast to the 1790 Declaration of Rights, the 1776 Declaration of 
Rights characterized the rights as "inherent and inalienable" rather than "inherent 
and indefeasible." PA. CONST. of 1776, ch. I (Dec!. of Rights) , § 1. The 1790 
Declaration of Rights added explicit recognition of the right of "acquiring, 
possessing and protecting" one' s reputation. PA. CONST. of 1790, art. IX, § 1. 
Further, it deleted the 1776 reference to "pursuing ... safety," and deleted the 
right to "obtaining ... happiness." PA. CONST. of 1776, ch. I (Dec!. o f 
Rights), § 1. 
49 PA. CONST. of 1790, art. !X, § 26. 
50 See, e.g., PA. CONST. art. I,§§ 1, 25; PA. CONST. of 1874, art. I,§§ 1, 
26; P A. CONST. of 1838, art. IX, §§ 1, 26. 
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Virginia. 51 Each state apparently viewed the provisions as having 
legal rather than merely hortatory effect. 52 In the 1780s, 
Massachusetts Chief Justice William Cushing construed the 
:Massachusetts clause to aboiish slavery. 53 Virginia rejected a 
similar result a generation later, not because Virginia's "equally 
free and independent" provision was without legal effect, but 
because the effect was limited "to white persons and native 
American Indians" rd.ther than i1~frican Arnericans. 54 
In Pennsylvania, the judicial enforceability of the "equally free 
and independent" provisions was recognized with no less emphasis. 
In 1795, a Pennsylvania court declared an act of the Pennsylvania 
legislature to be an unconstitutional violation of the "inherent and 
unalienable right" of possessing propeity, relying on Section 1 of 
the Declaration of Rights of the first Pennsylvania Constitution. 55 
In 1802, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania entertained an 
argument challenging a state statute as unconstitutional, both as a 
51 Williams, supra note 46, at 1199. John Adams stated that the 
Pennsylvania Declaration was "taken almost verbatim from that of Virginia." 
See J. PAUL SELSAM, THE PENNSYLVANIA CONSTITUTION OF 1776: A STUDY 
IN REVOLUTIONARY DEMOCRACY 178 (1936). Massachusetts' provision was 
adopted in 1780 and drew on the models of Virginia fu'"ld Pennsylvania. See 
WILLI P. ADAMS, THE FIRST AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONS 175 (1980). 
52 For a discussion of Massachusetts and Virginia courts that have invoked 
natural law as part of judicial review, see Suzanna Sherry, Natural Law in the 
States, 61 U. CIN. L. REv. 171 ( 1992) [hereinafter Sherry, Natural Law]; see 
also Suzanna Sherry, The Early Virginia Tradition of Extra-Textual 
Interpretation, 53 ALB. L. REV. 297 (1989). 
53 See ROBERT }'1. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED: ANTISLAVERY AND THE 
JUDICIAL PRocESs 47, 48 (1975) (reporting on Commonwealth v. Jennison) (no 
official report of the arguments to the court or the jury instructions survive); 
JOHN C. HURD, THE LAW OF FREEDOM AND BONDAGE IN THE UNITED STATES 
29, 30 n.1 (1862); cj. Winchendon v. Hartfield, 4 Mass. 123, 127 (1808) 
(stating that slavery was "tolerated until the ratification of the present 
[Massachusetts] constitution"). 
54 Hudgins v. Wrights, 11 Va. (1 Hen. & M.) 134, 144 (1806); COVER, 
supra note 53, at 50-55; HURD, supra note 53, at 246 n.l. For a discussion of 
Virginia's natural rights jurisprudence, see Sherry, Natural Law, supra note 52. 
In Crenshaw v. Slate River Co., 27 Va. (6 Rand.) 245, 276 (1828) (Green, J., 
concui1'ing), Justice Green relied on the inherent rights provision to invalidate 
a statute infringing on property rights. 
55 VanHorne's Lessee v. Dorrance, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 304, 310 (1795). 
.WIDENER JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW 
p r -i ,, 
~ "I 01. .) 
violation of the "inherent right to property" and as a violation. of 
the "equality of rights" guaranteed by Section 1 of the 1790 
Declaration of Rights. 56 Since that time, Pennsylvania courts have 
regularly viewed the "equally free and independent" provision as 
conferring judicially enforceable rights. 57 
The task, thus, is not to defend the daim that courts can 
enforce "inherent and indefeasible" rights; it is rather to identify 
exactly what "inherent and indefeasibl.c" rigllts l-\rtic1e 1, Section 
1 protects. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania announced 
emplw.tically, but cryptically, over a decade ago that the "i!'lterest 
in avoiding disclosure of personal matters . . . . finds explicit 
pmtecticm in . . _ Art. I , § 1. "58 V!h~\t is explicit to some is 
56 Corrunonwealtb v. Franklin, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 255 (1802). In Franklin, the 
defendants were indicted for violating a statute that made it a crime to 
"conspire" to assert title not granted by Pennsylvania to land in Northhampton, 
Northumberland, or Luzerne counties. ld. at 255. The defendants, who asserted 
title under a Connecticut grant, challenged the stah1te as unconstitutional, both 
because it was an infringement of their "inherent and indefeasible" right to 
property and because, directed at only three counties, it denied equality. !d. at 
258. 
The seriatim opinions of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, rejecting the 
defendants' arguments, are not reported in any detail, but the extensively 
reported arguments of Commonwealth counsel do not question the power of the 
court to declare the statute unconstitutional for violating Section 1. Rather, the 
prevailing arguments were directed to the proposition that Connecticut did not 
have the power to generate a constitutionally protected property right within 
Pen.i1sylvania in the first place, and that the conflict with Connecticut was a 
"local evil" that could be dealt with by special legislation. /d. at 260. 
57 Although Justice Gibson's famous dissent in Eakins v. Raub, 12 Serg. & 
Rawle 330, 344 (1825), raised doubts about the propriety of judicial review of 
legislation under the state constitution, by 1845 even he took the position that 
the Pennsylvania Constitutional Convention of 1838 "by their silence sanctioned 
the pretensions of the courts to deal freely with acts of the legislature. " Norris 
v. Clymer, 2 Pa. 277, 281 (1845). 
58 In re June 1979 Allegheny County Investigating Grand Jury, 415 A.2d 73, 
77 (Pa. 1980); see also Denoncourt v. Pennsylvania State Ethics Comm'n, 470 
A.2d 945, 948 (Pa. 1983); .fn re Pittsburgh Action A.gainst Rape, 428 A.2d 126, 
135 (Pa. 1981) (O'Brien, C.J., concurring); id. at 149 (Larsen, J., dissenting); 
Barasch v. Pennsylvania Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 576 A.2d 79 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 
199'0), ajf'd on other grounds, 605 A. 2d 1198 (Pa. 1992); Fischer v. 
Commonwealth, Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 482 A.2d 1148, 1159 (Pa. Commw. 
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"shadowy" to others, 59 and I must confess that I have read Article 
I, Section 1 quite a few times in search of the "explicit" protection 
against the disclosure of private matters. The closest I have come 
to finding that protection is where the text places the right to 
acquire , possess , and protect "reputation" with similar rights to 
life, liberty, and property. 60 
Government disclosure of private and sensitive matters to the 
community at large can certainly taint the citizen's reputation. 61 
This cannot, however, be the whole answer. On one hand, there 
are govemment disclosures of inforrnation (like announcing the 
tme ownership of a polluting dump or an abusive nursing home) 
that can devastate a citizen's reputation without raising substantial 
objections based on intrusion of privacy. 62 On the other hand, it 
Ct. 1984) (en bane). 
39 Denoncourt, 470 A.2d at 950 (Hutchinson, J., concurring and dissenting) 
(objecting to the "shadowy reaches of the right of privacy the judiciary has 
interpolated into our state and federal constitutions"). 
ro See, e.g., Hatchard v. Westinghouse Broadcasting Co., 532 A.2d 346, 
351 (Pa. 1987) (holding that the "special value placed on an individual's 
reputation in the Pennsylva.rlla Constitution" requires a narrow construction of 
the newspaper source shield Jaw because reputation is a "fundamental right") ; 
Moyer v. Phillips, 341 A.2d 441 , 443 (Pa. 1975) ("protection of one's 
reputation is a fundamental right classified with life, liberty and property"); 
Meas v. Johnson, 39 A. 562, 563 (Pa. 1898) (stating that reputation is "in the 
same class with life liberty and property"); Pennsylvania Bar Ass'n v. 
Pennsylvania Ins. Dep't, 607 A.2d 850, 855-57 (Pa. Cornrow. Ct. 1992) 
(reputation is a fundamental right under Article I, Section 1 requiring due 
process and strict scrutiny). 
As originally drafted, Article I, Section 1 of the Pennsylvar1ia Constitution 
gave no explicit recognition to a right to privacy as it relates to one's reputation . 
I have been unable to find legislative history concerning the insertion of 
"reputation" into Article I, Section 1 in 1790. Cf THOMAS R. WHITE, 
COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF PENNSYLVANIA 114 n.2 (1907). 
61 Cf Stenger v. Lehigh Valley Hasp. Ctr., 609 A.2d 796, 800 (Pa. 1992) 
("[T]he object of such a right is, in part, to protect an individual from revealing 
matters which could impugn his character and subj ect him to ridicule or 
persecution."). 
62 Cf. Hibbs v. Neighborhood Org. to Rejuvenate Tenant Hous., 252 A.2d 
622 (Pa. 1969) (reversing an injunction against protestors who picketed the 
home of a slumlord who conducted his real estate activities in a secretive 
manner). 
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seems we could object on privacy grounds to a demand that 
doctors report the sexual practices of their patients to government 
agents, even if the infonnation remained a matter knmvn only to 
those officials . 63 
Tne right to privacy is thus not equivalent to the rjght to 
p rotect reput2.tion. Justice 1viusmanno seems to have captured an 
irnportant additional element of the right to privacy when he relied 
Gn A.rticle I , Section 1 to condemn official wiretapping because 
"[o ]ne of the pursuits of happiness is privacy . . . . The greatest joy 
·"n' .-., .. ,~ .,-, '0 "" ovn p n ' "'T1~"'d by ·rnorta1l lTI3i1 l.S tO ·>e"' l hl.D1«eJf' n~~ stp -~ ,-f f t _cu_ : ..... c'iU ; \._, v"-}-' ......., l'v . ....... v . . \ . ~ v -~ . " u _ 1 ,.. __ !..d 1...._,.. 1_ u 1 
hi s f8.te ,-this in small as well as in big things. "64 
To be obsen,ed is, i11 some dimension, to be controUed and to 
be vulnerable. The status of "equally free and independent" 
citizens--as distinguished from citizens who are simply "created 
eq ual" in the contemporaneous Declaration of 
Independence65-was established at the outset in Pennsylvania's 
fi rst constitution in 1776. Preserved intact for two centuries, the 
document constitu.tes a natural basis for limits on the ability of the 
government to impose vulnerability and dependence on its 
citizens. 66 This concern draws further strength from tort cases 
63 Cf In re B., 394 A.2d 419 (Pa. 1978) (striking down a subpoena for a 
mother ' s psychiatric records to be used by a juvenile court psychologist in 
determining placement of her son) . This perception has not always carried the 
day. It was in dissent that Justice Larsen acknowledged that "'[i]t is knowledge 
of private and personal matters by another that is offensive--not that the 
knowledge may or may not continue on a course of travel to yet another eager 
ear.'" In re Pittsburgh Action Against Rape, 428 A.2d 126 , 149 (Pa. 1981) 
(Larsen , J., dissenting) (quoting In re June 1979 Allegheny County Investigating 
Grand Jury, 415 A.2d 73, 79 (Pa. 1980) (Larsen, J., dissenting)); if. Marks v. 
Bell Tel. Co., 33 i A.2d 424 (Pa. 1975) (denying a tort recovery for an invasion 
of privacy where a wiretap recording was never heard by another human being). 
64 Commonwealth v. Murray, 223 A.2d 102, 109-10 (Pa. 1966) (plurality 
opinion); see Commonwealth v. Chaitt, 112 A.2d 379, 384 (Pa. 1955_) 
( r "' T J • • ) ,\Lusmanno, ., . , C!!Ssentmg . 
65 T HE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 1 (U.S. 1776). 
66 Cf Commonwealth v. Brachbill , 555 A.2d 82, 90 (Pa. 1989) ("We are 
fortunate that we are not a part of a totalitarian regime that insists upon 
ascertaining our innermost thoughts and aspirations. It is that freedom of 
individual privacy that is the hallmark of the society that we are fortunate to 
enjoy ." ) . 
] 
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that have recognized the invasion of privacy as an assault on the 
personality, and the explicit protection against searches of persons, 
houses , papers, and effects in A.rticle I, Section 8_67 
Relying on these commjtments to privacy, Pennsylvania cou rts 
have, in the past decade and a half, fim1ly established hurdles of 
constitutional magnitude in the path of government actions that 
breach the citizen's "right to be let alone" by demanding the 
disclosure of personal information.68 The strength of those 
67 Stenger v. Lehigh Valley Hosp. Ctr., 609 A.2d 796, 300 (Pa. J 992) 
(asserting without identifying its source, that "the right of privacy is a well-
settled part of the j uri sprudential tradition in this Commomvealth"): if. id. at 
802 (citing search and seizure cases and tort cases in support of the proposition 
that "[u]nder the Pennsylvania Constitution, the right to be let alone has also 
been recognized"). Justice Manderino's opinion in In reB., 394 A.2d 419, 425 
(Pa. 1978), relied in addition to the "individual's interest in preventing the 
disclosure of information revealed in the context of a psychotherapist-patient 
relationship" on the "penumbras" of Article I, Sections 3-4 (freedom of 
religion); Section 7 (freedom of press subject to limits for abuse); Sections 8-9 
(self-incrimination); Section 20 (assembly); Section 23 (quartering of troops); 
Sections 25 (power in the people); Section 26 (no discrimination in political 
subdivisions); and Section 30 (injury to reputation). 
Another potential source of privacy rights is the commitment to tolerance and 
freedom of conscience that dates to William Penn's original chatter. Cf Robert 
N.C. Nix, Jr., & Mary M. Schweitzer, Pennsylvania's Contribution to the 
Writing and Ratification of the Constitution, 72 PA. MAG. OF HIST. & 
BIOGRAPHIES, Jan. 1988, at 3, 6 (Pennsylvania ' s record of civil and religious 
liberty made it a leader in the early Republic). History, however, is a slippery 
tool. \Vhat was a great protection of liberty in 1776 may not seem so today. In 
1682, Number 37 of the Laws Agreed Upon in England by Penn and the settlers 
provided that "swearing, cursing, ly ing, profane talking, drunkenness, drinking 
of healths, and obscene words" would be discouraged and severely punished, 
along with "prizes, stage plays, cards, dice, may games, masques, revels, [and] 
bull-baiting." See PROCEEDINGS RELATIVE TO CALLING THE CONVENTIONS OF 
1776 AND 1790, at 30 (Harrisburg, Pa., JohnS. Wiestling 1825). Section 45 of 
the Frame of Government, adopted in 1776, likewise required that "laws for the 
encouragement of virtue and prevention of vice . . . be constantly kept in 
force." Jd. at 64 (citing PA. CoNST. of 1776, ch. II (Frame of Gov't), § 45). 
68 The earliest effort along these lines that I have discovered is a dissenting 
opinion in Board of Sch. Directors v. Snyder, 29 A.2d 34, 38 (Pa. 1942) 
(Maxey , J., dissenting). Justice Maxey, joined by Justices Stem a.1d Parker, 
argued that the dismissal of a teacher for failure to notify the school board that 
she had become pregnant during her sabbatical was improper because it was a 
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barriers has varied in two ways depending on the nature of the 
demands. 
In one dimension, the degree of judicial scrutiny has depended 
on the nature of the infonnation at stake. The underlying right to 
be "equally free and independent" suggests that information is 
protected based on the degree of its threat to the citizen's sense of 
independence. The more personally vu lnerable the disclosure of 
information renders the individual, the more pressing must be the 
state's justification for protecting it. To identify one's business 
affairs is inconvenient, uncomfortable, and in some circumstances 
ham1ful, but it does not, in itself, greatly decrease the sense of 
being an equal and independent member of society. By contrast, 
to be naked in public, with one ' s person involuntarily exposed to 
view, is the antithesis of indepencience;69 to have secrets that 
"trespass upon the sacred precincts of private and domestic life," and was an 
"unwarranted invasion of her right of privacy" rooted in the common law. !d. 
at 39. In the dissent's view, there was no basis for requiring the teacher to 
"divulge to a group of school directors such a strictly personal matter as 
approaching motherhood." !d. The majority viewed the teacher's failure to 
inform the board as an obstinate refusal to abide by the school's regulations. !d. 
at 36. 
69 See Livingwell (North), Inc. v. Pennsylvania Human Relations Comm'n, 
606 A.2d 1287 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1992). The Livingwell court found that 
"[p ]rivacy interests are especially protected involving a person's 'body,' clothed 
or unclothed .... 'Having one's body inspected by members of the opposite sex 
may invade the individual's most fundamental privacy right .... '" Jd. at 1292 
(quoting City of Philadelphia v. Pennsylvania Human Relations Cornm'n, 300 
A.2d 97, 103 (Pa. Cornmw. Ct. 1973)); if. Commonwealth v. Martin, 626 A.2d 
556, 560 (Pa. 1993) ("[A]lthough privacy may relate both to property and to 
one's person, an invasion of one's person ... in the usual case, [is a] more 
severe intrusion on one's privacy interest than an invasion of one's property."); 
Commonwealth v. Kohl, 615 A.2d 308, 312 (Pa. 1992) (quoting Schmerber v. 
California, 384 U.S. 757, 772 (1966)) (striking down an implied consent to a 
blood test under Article I, Section 8 on the basis that the "'integrity of an 
individual's person is a cherished value of our society'"); Commonwealth v. 
Kean, 556 A.2d 374, 380-82 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989). Kean held that the 
intimacies of married life are entitled to the "highest degree of privacy" under 
Article I, Section 8. !d. at 380. "There is something deep in the roots of our 
civilization which leads us to associate nudity with privacy and to shield our 
bodies from the uninvited eye." ld. at 382: 
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were confided to a trusted professional broadcast to the public is 
' . ~ d __J h. ' • . . . 1 ,, to exp101t t11at . epenuence, W111cn renaers a cmzen ,.ess rree. 
Demands conceming financial affairs thus require that the state 
demonstrate that the "government interest is significant and there 
is no alternate reasonable method of lesser intrusiveness . "70 
D _, ~ . . . 1 ' ' . ~ _ emanus ror mt1mate1y persona aata., sucn as suopoenas 10r 
. ., . 1 . . ' f ' ., ~' r -mtormatwn revea ed m tne context o. Dsvcnotnera.L.''Y' · or me<)ICoJ 
A ... '-
70 Denoncourt v. Pennsylv<uJia State Ethics Comm'n, 470 /\.2d 945, 949 
(Pa. 1983) (footnote omitted) (invaiidating financ ial reporting requirements of 
farnilies of public off}cials, because /lit dces not reaEstlc(:d_ly hold out rr1uch hope 
for effectiveness"); if. Lunderstadt v. Pennsylvania House o f Representatives, 
519 A.2d 408, 414-15 (Pa. 1986) (striking down legislative subpoena for 
personal financial records). Justice Flaherty balanced legislative interests with 
an "individual's interest in maintaining privacy," by requiring "probable cause 
that the particular records sought contain evidence of civil or criminal 
wrongdoing." !d. at 413, 415; see also id. at 41 5 (Hutchinson, J., concurring) 
(checking compliance with the law is beyond proper legislative purpose); id. at 
416-17 (Zappala, J., concurring) (stating that subpoenaed information was "too 
sweeping in scope to be enforced" and not "reasonably relevant"); Snider v. 
Thornburgh, 436 A.2d 593, 599 (Pa. 1981) (upholding financial reporting 
requirements for public officials when "intrusion into appellants' private affairs 
... is not great; the Legislature's interest in securing public confidence in the 
government, at all levels, is not small"); Pennsylvania Bar Ass'n v. 
Pennsylvania Ins. Dep't, 607 A.2d 850 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1992) (fmding no 
adequate justification for injuring reputation by keeping list of attorneys whose 
clients are suspected of insurance fraud); Barasch v . Pennsylvania Pub. Utils. 
Con1,:n'n, 576 A. 2d 79, 89 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1990), aff'd on other grounds, 
605 A.2d 1198 (Pa. 1992) (striking down approval by Public Utility 
Commission of caller identification because "consumers of telephone service 
should not suffer an invasion, erosion or deprivation of their privacy rights to 
protect the unascertainable number of individuals or groups who receive 
nuisance, obscene or annoying telephone calls which can ... [be] otherwise 
dealt with by existing services"). 
71 In reB., 394 A.2d 419 (Pa. 1978) (holding unconstitutional on privacy 
grounds a juvenile court subpoena of a mother's psychiatric records in an effort 
to determine placement for her son). As the court stated, "[t]he individual's right 
of privacy, however, must prevail" despite a legitimate interest in obtaining 
information for appropriate placement of children. ld. at 426; if. O' Donnell v. 
United States, 891 F.2d 1079 (3d Cir. 1989) (finding an action for the faiiure 
to protect psychiatric confidentiality in light of the stc'1te constitutional 
commitment to privacy); Commonwealth e..'\: rel. Platt v. Platt, 404 A. 2d 410 
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1979) (declining to allow a patient to prevent a treating 
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records, 72 requirements of compulsory blood tests , 73 or demands 
for details of the experiences of rape or incest victims, 74 will not 
psychiHtri st from testifying in a commitment proceeding , on the theory that 
exclusion of the psychiatrist ' s testimony would place the determination of 
"mental he?Jth" in the hands of lay witnesses) , Compare In re Pittsburgh Action 
Against Rape, 423 A,2d 126, 130 (Pa, 198 1) (declining to es tablish a 
constit:1tionally based privilege for rape cri sis centers) with Conm10nwealth v . 
\Ni ison , 602 iL2d 1290 , 1294 (Pa. 1992) (stating that the statuto ry privilege for 
rape cris\s ~~ enters refiects the legislative belief that PAAR cons tituted "a grave 
injustice coiTUTtitted against those who, because of lesser economic means, were 
forced to seek counseling from a public center rather than a private therapi st"); 
compore olso Wilson, 602 A.2d at 1296 (rej ecting the c laim that a rape 
defendant's right to compulsory process was violated by statutory privilege) with 
Commonwealth v. Lloyd, 567 A.2d 1357 (Pa. 1989) (holding that defendant's 
compulsory process and confrontation rights mandated disclosure of psychiatric 
records , without mentioning constitutional privilege). 
72 Stenger v . Lehigh Valley Hasp. Ctr., 609 A.2d 796 (Pa. 1992) (holding 
that an intrusion into the medical privacy by the anonymous discovery of HIV 
test results of other recipients of allegedly tainted blood, or anonymous 
questionnaires sent to donor of allegedly tainted blood in an AIDS liability case, 
v;as justified by a "compelling state interest" and the disclosure of the identity 
of the AIDS infected donor was not); In re June 1979 Allegheny County 
Investigating Grand Jury, 415 A.2d 73 (Pa. 1980) (stating that the privacy 
interest of patients in avoiding disclosure of medical information to a grand jury 
was protected by the Pennsylvania Constitution , but that it was not infringed 
upon because of grand jury secrecy); see also id. at 79 (Larsen, J. , dissenting) 
(stating that the court should have held that the right to privacy was infringed); 
cf. Commonwealth v. Moore, 584 A.2d 936 (Pa. 1991) (construing narrowly an 
exception to the confidentiality requirements of the Disease Prevention and 
Control Act and refusing to allow a subpoena by prosecution of a rape 
defendant ' s medical records); Sanderson v. Bryan, 522 A.2d 1138, 1142 (Pa. 
Super. Ct. 1987) (holding that "by allowing [a medical malpractice] plaintiff 
access to the medical records of other patients," the constitutional right to 
privacy was violated). 
73 John M . v. Paula T., 571 A.2d 1380, 1385-86 (Pa. 1990) (denying efforts 
to compel a blood test to negate marital paternity). 'TI1eJohn M. court stated that 
"a legitimate expectation of privacy ... cannot be violated without ... a 
judicial determination that the government or other private party has compelling 
needs an d interests which justify the invasion of privacy." !d. at 1385. 
74 F ischer v . Commonwealth, Dep't of Pub . Welfare , 482 A .2d 1148 (Pa. 
Commw. Ct. 1984) (en bane), Fischer, which involved a 72-hour reporting 
requirement for rape or incest as a condition to obtaining state funding for 
abortions, was, on the basis of the record established by the trial court, an easy 
: '?{ 
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be upheld without a showing of strong necessity for the 
infonnation. 75 
In a second dimension, the state justifications required have 
depended on the safeguards surrounding the uses to which the 
information is put. Unlike the Federal Constitution, Article I , 
Section 1 of the Pennsylvania Constitution explicitly guards the 
cit1zenr/s interest m reputation. 76 Under this aspect of 
----------------·----···-- -·- --------
case. The Fischer court reasoned that "the state's intrusion [•Nould not] effect 
[the requirement's) purpose." ld. at 1159. The court found th:,t the trauma 
accompanying disclosure of a.r1 experience of rape or incest constituted a "severe 
invasion of the woman' s privacy [and) greatly outweighed" the goals of a 
reporting requirement. ld. at 1160-61. Because "the only function served by the 
reporting requirement [was] to compound the original abuse ... . the reporting 
requirements [would] not increase the veracity of the claim nor [v/Ould] they 
motivate .. _ 'fresh complaints.'" ld. at 1160. 
In subsequent litigation, a single judge found that the interests furthered by 
having a reporting requirement without a time limit, were sufficiently weighty 
to deny the clear right to legal relief necessary to obtain a preliminary 
injunction. This was true because the record indicated that the recipients of the 
reports "rarely, if ever, disclose[ d) the victims' names" and the judge believed 
that "privacy rights can and will be respected by the public officials" who 
obtained the information. Fischer v. Commonwealth, Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 
543 A.2d 177, 183-84 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1988). 
As a matter of full disclosure, the reader should be aware that I was one of 
plaintiffs' counsel in each of the Fischer cases. 
75 Stenger v. Lehigh Valley Hosp. Ctr., 609 A.2d 796, 800 (Pa. 1992) 
("balancing weighty competing private and state interests"); John M., 571 A.2d 
at 1385-86 (requiring a "compelling" interest for a blood test); q: Fraternal 
Order of Police, Lodge No. 5 v. City of Philadelphia, 812 F.2d 105, 110 (3d 
Cir. 1987) (viewing Pennsylvania constitutional analysis as a "flexible 
balancing" with progressively greater st&-,dards of justification depending on the 
intimate nature of the infonnation); Stenger, 609 A.2d at 801 (the United States 
Supreme Court applies "increasing levels of scrutiny corresponding to increasing 
levels of confidentiality intrusions"); id. at 803 (upholding discovery because it 
was the "least intrusive method available ... to protect the public interest"). 
76 This protection provides a solid basis for Justice Nix's proposal that the 
courts of Pennsylvania reject, as a matter of state constih1tional constmction, the 
conclusion of Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976), that reputation was not a 
right protected by the Due Process Clause. See Nix: Stares Must Lead Privacy 
Battle, PENNSYLVANIA L.J., Sept. 28, 1987, at 5; if. Pennsylvania Bar Ass'n 
v. Pennsylvania Ins. Dep't, 607 A.2d 850 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1992) (en ba.'1c) 
(holding a statute unconstitutional for infringing the right to reputation without 
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Pennsylvania ' s constitutional protection of privacy, the scrutiny of 
demands for information increases with the threatened degree of 
public exposure. An intrusion is vievved as less of an invasion of 
privacy >;vhere the govem.ment will guard the information as 
confidential than where it can lead to subsequent disclosure to the 
public at large . 77 Indeed , Pennsy1vania' s constitutional protection 
of reputation places limits on the state's ability to disseminate even 
. ;; . . h ' . ' 1 ~ b . InlOflTlatlOn 1t as come oy m tne norma, course ot usm.ess 
. ' ,. . . f . . . 78 wJ.tnout mrect mvaswn O' pnvate aon1ams. · 
due process). 
77 Compare Stenger, 609 A.2cl at 801-02 ("[w]ith no name associated \vith 
the disclosure, no disrepute can occur [thus] [t]he evil unleashed by divulging 
the secret of AIDS fal ls harmlessly into oblivion once it hits the shield of 
anonymity"); In re June 1979 Allegheny County Investigating Grand Jury, 415 
A.2d 73 (Pa. 1980) (stating that the privacy interest of patients in avoiding 
disclosure of medical information to grand jury is protected by the Pennsylvania 
Constitution, but it was not infringed in this instance because of grand jury 
secrecy) with Boettger v. Miklich, 599 A.2d 713, 717-18 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 
1991), appeal granted, 606 A.2d 903 (1992) (construing Wiretap Act to grant 
damages for dissemination of wiretap transcript to IRS agents, in light of the 
"Commonwealth's constitutionally protected right to privacy"); Fraternal Order 
of Police, 81 2 F.2d at 111 (construing Pennsylvania's constitutional analysis as 
applying "stricter scrutiny when there is unguarded public disclosure of 
confidential information," and striking down a demand for personal information 
because of inadequate safeguards). Cf Boettger v. Loverro, 555 A.2d 1234, 
1240 (Pa. 1989) (imposing liability on newspapers for publication of wiretap 
transcripts released in violation of state wiretap act; privacy interests particularly 
strong because information gathered "in temporary derogation of Pennsylvania 
citizen's right to privacy"), vacated sub nom. Easton Publishing Co. v. Boettger, 
493 U.S. 885 (1990), rev'd, 587 A.2d 712 (Pa. 1991) (holding that in light of 
First Amendment interests, news media republication is not covered by statute 
where media relied on government's implied representation of lawfulness of 
dissemination); In re Seegcrist, 539 A.2d 799 (Pa. 1989) (upholding refusal to 
close commitment conference because no confidential medical records were to 
be presented). But if. Pe1msylvania v. Milice, 584 iL2d 997, 998 (Pa. Super. 
Ct. 1991) (upholding refusal to close comwitment hearing despite the 
presentation of confidential psychiatric testimony, on basis of "powerful tradition 
of openness," and prior public knowledge of mental illness). 
78 In the midst of the McCarthy-era Red Scare, Pem1sylvania courts were 
ambivalent in their protection of reputation despite the words of Article I, 
Section 1. Compare Matson v. Jackson, 83 A. 2d 134, 137 (Pa. 1951) (enjoining 
hearing by Attorney General into II communistic leanings 11 of a local official. The 
I 
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Our hypothetical ordinance stands at the most intrusive end of 
each spectrum. The infonnation at issue is the product of an 
interaction in which the patient, by necessity, makes herself 
vulnerable by putting herself in the care of another in a fiduciary 
relationship; it concems the most intimate bodily conditions or 
activities. In the second dimension, there are no safeguards against 
disclosure. Indeed public exposure is the goal of the statute. "tv1ere 
govemment expostulation about public health or safety, therefore, 
\vill not justify the reporting requirement. 79 
Matson court stated that "[t)o permit the existence of the power which the 
Attorney General asserts would be to open the door to possible abuses . . . 
where the good name and reputation of the victim . . . could be subtly and 
maliciously attacked ... without any right or possibility of legal redress.") with 
Matson v. Margiotti, 88 A.2d 892, 893 (Pa. 1952) (stating that the Attorney 
General was absolutely immune from a libel action arising out of his public 
accusations of "Communistic tendencies "). 
During the last decade and a half, there has been more protection from the 
dissemination of government data. See Wolfe v. Beal, 384 A.2d 1187, 1189 (Pa . 
1978) (holding that there is a right to expunge a record of illegal commitment 
to a mental hospital based on the Article I, Section 1 protection of reputation); 
cf McMullan v. Wohlgemuth, 308 A.2d 888, 897 (Pa. 1973) (interpreting 
statute to prevent the dissemination of the names of welfare recipients because 
the "Commonweal th 's interest in protecting the privacy of those it aids through 
public assistance is paramount and compelling") ; Mon Valley Unemployed 
Comm. v. Department of Pub. Welfare, 618 A.2d 1227, 1229 (Pa. Commw. 
Ct. 1992) (interpreting statute to restrict the disclosure of compilation of welfare 
liens "in order to protect the privacy rights of individuals who receive welfare 
benefits" despite the public nature of the liens individually). 
79 TI1ese issues will come before the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania again 
in the appeals of In re Miiton Hershey Medical Ctr., 595 A.2d 1290 (Pa. Super. 
Ct. 1991) (ordering the release of information concerning a doctor' s HIV 
positive status), appeal granted, 611 A.2d 712 (Pa. 1992); cJ. Pennsylvania Bar 
Ass'n v. Pennsylvania Ins. Dep't, 607 A.2d 850 (Pa. Conunw. Ct. 1992) (en 
bane) (striking down a statutori ly mandated registry of attorneys associated with 
allegedly fraudulent insurance claims under Article I, Section 1 protection of 
reputation). 
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IV. PRIVACY AND AUTONOMY: THE T'EXT POll'TTS BEYOND 
There may be a final constitutional fault in the city's course of 
actwn. Pennsylvania courts have regularly stated that 
Pennsylvania's right to privacy encompasses both freed orn from 
disclosure of personal infom1ation and the freedom to .make certain 
important and intimate decisions without gmlernrnent coercion . so 
The very purpose of the municipal exercise in our hypothetical is 
to attempt to coerce residents because of their sexual activities. 
It is not entirely clear where the "personal autonom.y" branch 
of privacy finds its federal roots, and the courts of Pennsylvania 
have been no more explicit on this issue . Unlike the federal courts, 
hmvever, Pennsylvania's judiciar; has a strong textual basis to 
support an implied right to privacy. The proposition that "(a] li men 
are bom equally free and independent, and have certain inherent 
and indefeasible rights, "81 is certainly broad enough to encompass 
the right to personal autonomy. The identification of life, liberty, 
property, reputation, and the pursuit of happiness as "among" 
those rights strongly suggests that other "inherent" rights are also 
protected. 82 The very breadth of that provision, however, is 
80 See Denoncourt v. Pennsylvania State Ethics Comm'n, 470 A.2d 945, 948 
(Pa. 1983); In re June 1979 Allegheny County Investigating Grand Jury, 415 
A.2d 73, 77 (Pa. 1980); Fischer v. Commonwealth, Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 482 
A.2d 1148, 1159 (Pa. Cornrow. Ct. 1984) (en bane). 
81 PA. CONST. art. I, § 1. 
82 Cf Commonwealth v. Edmunds, 586 A.2d 887, 896 (Pa. 1991) ("[T]he 
Pennsylvania Constitution was ... meant to reduce tD writing a deep history of 
unwritten legal and moral codes which had guided the colonists from the 
begitming of William Penn's charter in 1681. ").The neighboring courts in New 
Jersey have, for a long time, read that state's almost identically worded Article 
I, Paragraph 1 to embody a "right to privacy" as one of the "natural and 
inalienable" rights that the provision protects. McGovern v. Van Riper , 43 A.2d 
514 (N.J. Ch. 1945), aff'd, 45 A.2d 842 (N.J. 1946). McGovern was quoted 
with approval in Hennessey v. Coastal Eagle Point Oil Co., 609 A.2d 11, 17 
(N.J. 1992), which recognized protection against random drug testing under 
Article I, Paragraph 1 of New Jersey's Constitution. See also State v . Saunders, 
381 A.2d 333 (N.J. 1977) (Schreiber, J., concurring) (recogni.z.ing the right to 
sexual autonomy under Article I, Paragraph 1); In re Quinlan, 355 A .2d 647 
(N.J. 1976) (recognizing right to refuse medical treatment under Article I, 
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problematic, for it gives no indication which activities fall within 
the protected class; riding a motorcycle without a helmet is as 
much a pursuit of happiness as is engaging in unconventional 
sexual activities. 33 
At this point, I really only have one solid observation on the 
subject. The Suprerne Court of Pennsylvania has said that "the 
right to engage in extramarital sexual activities [falls] within the 
zone of privacy , "54 v; hich can be regulated only on the basis of 
" . '. . t " S'i ..,., h h h ' a compelnng state mteresc. · .r:.ven ere, 10wever, to t _e c.est 
of my knmvledge, Pennsylvania courts have yet to strik:e down a 
Paragraph 1). 
~3 Cf Commonwealth v. Kautz, 491 A. 2d 864 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985) 
(dismissing privacy-based challenge to motorcycle helmet requirement). The text 
of Article I, Section l is aiso broad enough to logically encompass prostitution 
and marital rape. Cf Commonwealth v. Shoemaker, 518 A. 2d 591, 594 (Pa. 
Super. Ct. 1986) (rej ecting a claim that the marital-rape statute violates the right 
to privacy because of a "compelling interest in protecting the fundamental right 
of all individuals to control the integrity of his or her own body"); 
Commonwealth v. tv-ilinirich, 498 A.2d 395, 402 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985) ("If 
'forcible compulsion' is to include sexual intercourse induced by 'any threat' . 
. . [then] the legislature may well have created a legal monster beyond its 
comprehension by inviting courts and juries into the privacy of the marital 
bedroom."); Commonwealth v. Dodge, 429 A.2d 1143 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1981) 
(rejecting the claim that prosecution of prostitution violates Pennsylvania's right 
to privacy). For other possibilities, see Adler v. Montefiore Hosp. Ass'n, 311 
A.2d 634, 648 (Pa. 1973) (Roberts, J. , dissenting) (suggesting the right to 
privacy "to be treated by the physician of his or her choice"). Cf Pennsylvania 
Medical Soc'y v. Foster. 608 A.2d 633, 637 (Pa . Commw. CL 1992) (declining 
to consider a "patient 's right of personal privacy in the choice of physician"); 
Commonwealth v. Kallinger, 580 A.2d 887 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1990) (using 
federal standards a.11d authorizing involuntary feeding of a prisoner attempting 
to starve himself to death). 
84 Stenger v. Lehigh Valley Hosp. Ctr. , 609 A.2d 796, 802 (Pa. 1992). 
85 Jd. (characterizing Fabio v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 41 4 A. 2d 82 (Pa. 
1980)) . Fabio upheld the discharge of a policeman for engaging in extramarital 
sex, although it was opaque as to exactly where the "privacy" right was based. 
Fabio , 414 A.2d at 90. Fabio, citing federal precedent, stated that "[i]n 
Petlnsylvania, individuals have the right to engage in extrarnaritai sexuai 
activities free from governmental interference." ld. at 89. The court went on to 
comment that the "law is hazy as to the appropriate standard of j udicial scrutiny 
. . . but even under the strictest standards, the appellant 's privacy argument has 
no merit." ld. at 90. 
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government imposition for want of such a compelling state 
interest. In the last decade and a half, Pennsylvania courts have 
upheld the discharge of policemen for extramarital sex,86 and the 
denial-under a statute dating to 1915·--of worker 's compensation 
benefits to surv1vmg spouses living m "meretricious 
relationships. "87 In addition, Pennsylvania courts have reversed 
the granting of unemployment compensation benefits to parochial 
36 Fabio, 414 A.2d 82 (Pa. 1980); Faust v. Police Civil Serv. Comm'n, 347 
A.2d 765 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1975); (f Tomkiel v. Tredyff1;n Township, 440 
A. 2d 690 , 691 (Pa. Comi·nw. Ct. 1982) (stating that although private conduct 
consisting of sexual relationships is not protected, the use of obscene language 
to a prospective father-in-law was a "familial dispute having no impact upon the 
public" and therefore, was not conduct unbecoming of an officer). Somewhat 
inconsistently, in In re Dallesandro, 397 A. 2d 743 (Pa. 1979), the court declined 
to uphold a judicial disciplinary proceeding for extramarital sex, characterizing 
such efforts as entering "a most precarious area of inquiry for the state-the 
realm in which private moral beliefs are enforced and private notions of 
acceptable social conduct are treated as law. " !d. at 7 57. 
87 Nevis v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd., 416 A.2d 1134, 1137 
(Pa. Commw. Ct. 1980) (stating that no fundamental interest was involved and 
that the state is "properly concerned with fostering good morals by encouraging 
legally recognized and responsible family relationships and discouraging the 
formation of illicit relationships"). Some judges of the commonwealth court who 
have expressed discomfort about the outcome, apparently feel helplessly bound 
by precedent. See Bethenergy Mines, Inc. v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal 
Bd. (Sadvary), 543 A.2d 1268, 1269 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1988) ("a legislative 
attempt to regulate morality from an anachronistic era which has repeatedly 
survived due process and equal protection attacks which sunk similar minded 
criminal statutes ... years ago"), rev'd on other grounds, 570 A.2d 84 (Pa. 
1990). 
Meretricious relationships are those in which "two individuals are living 
together in a carnal way without benefit of marriage." Nevius, 416 A.2d at 
1136 . The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has softened the regime by holding 
that the Board may continue benefits when economic circumstances indicate that 
the surviving spouse is still dependent on the benefits. Bethenergy Mines, 570 
A.2d at 84. Review has recently been granted by the Supreme Court of 
Pennsylvania in McCusker v. Workmen's Compensation Appeai Bd. (Rushton 
Mining Co.), 603 A.2d 238 (Pa. Commw. Ct.) (relying on Nevius to dismiss a 
constitutional challenge to the exclusion), appeal granted, 613 A.2d 562 (Pa. 
1992). Additionally, a petition for review is currently pending in Shultz v. 
Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd. (Leroy Roofmg Co.), 621 A.2d 1239, 
1243 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1993). 
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school teachers discharged because of "cohabit[ ation] outside of 
JT!arriage j "88 as well as discharges for maniages of which their 
employer disapproved. 89 Jlvi oreover , m a case that Justice 
:tv1cDernwtt announced did "not concern the right to an 
abortion, "90 the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania declined to 
provide a state constitutional entitlement to state l\:fedicaid funding 
for n1edical1y necessary tenninations of pregnancy . 91 
The d osest Pennsylvania courts have come to consummating 
the impulse toward iudicial activism in defense of Drivacv-based 
..::._ J ... .... 
ri:o-bts of autonomv in the last fifteen years was the rather colorful 
(:'J ~ 
f .---. l ' p "• 97 D d · • TY , , case o commonwea tn v. ~onadw . - DO!W w arose m .Plttsourgn 
at the Penthouse Theater, \Vhere Mildred Kannitz, >.Nhorn the court 
ir:forrns us was "k'1mx;n on the stage as 'Dawn Delight , ' "93 was 
arrested by plainclothes police officers who observed her engaging 
"in sexual acts with members of the audience. "94 l\As . Kannitz 
was charged with "voluntary deviate sexual intercourse" 95 under 
a statute that prohibited "[s]exual intercourse per os or per anus 
between human· beings who are not husband and wife. "96 As 
Justices Roberts, Nix, and O'Brien observed m dissent/7 
commercial sex in a public theater was hardly the most inviting 
circumstance in which to make an argument about the right to 
privacy. 98 
88 Bishop Carroll High Sch. v. Commonwealth, Unemployment 
Compensation Bd. of Review, 557 A.2d 1141, 1142 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1989), 
appeal denied , 575 A.2d 569 (Pa. 1990). 
89 Bishop Leonard Regional Catholic Sch. v. Commonwealth, 
Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review , 593 A.2d 28 (Pa. Con1111w. Ct. 
1991). 
90 F ischer v. Department of Pub. Welfare, 502 A. 2d 11 4, 116 (Pa. 1985) . 
91 !d. 
92 415 A.2d 47 (Pa. 1980). The Supreme Court of Pe1msylvania will have 
another opportunity in McCusker. 
93 !d. at 52 (Nix, J., dissenting). 
94 !d. 
95 !d. 
96 ld. at 49 n . l. 
'~7 Jd. at 52 ('Roberts, J. , dissenting) ; id. at 52-53 (Nix, J . , dissenting). 
98 According to the briefs before the Supreme Court of Permsylvania, Ms. 
Ka.nnitz's customers were arrested as well. Brief for Appellant at 4, 
Corn.monwealth v . Bonadio , 415 A.2d 47 (Pa. 1980) (Nos . 105-108). Because 
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Nonetheless, Justice Flaherty, writing for himself and Justice 
Kauffman, went on at length to expound the proposition that 
because the statute "regulate[d] the private conduct of consenting 
adults, 1199 and the conduct did not harm others, it exceeded the 
legitimate scope of governmental regulation. According to Justice 
Flaherty, II [s]piritual leadership, not the government, has the 
responsibility for striving to Improve the morality of 
individuals. II 100 
This libertarian proposition, however, commanded the support 
of only two justices. 101 Chief Justice Eagen and Justice Larsen 
voted to join Justices Flaherty and Kauffman in invalidating the 
prohibition for a different reason. They reached beyond shadowy 
commitments to libertarian philosophy and relied upon a somewhat 
the case was resolved on a motion to quash, the details of the nature of Ms. 
Kannitz's acts do not appear in either the briefs or the court's opinion. 
99 Bonadio, 415 A.2d at 50. 
100 !d. Even though Justice Holmes' stricture in Lochner v. New York, 198 
U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting), would hold that "[t]he Fourteenth 
Amendment does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer's Social Statics," Justice 
Flaherty in Bonadio seemed to argue in so many words that the Pennsylvania 
Constitution enacts John Stuart Mill's On Liberty. Bonadio, 415 A.2d at 50. As 
a matter of original intent, the proposition that a constitution adopted in 1776 
was designed to embody a philosophy published in 1859, attributes a remarkable 
foresight to the Framers of Pennsylvania's Constitution. 
Nonetheless, an indirect protection of "self-regarding" actions from 
government intervention is implicit in the guarantee against searches and 
seizures. To the extent that an action affects only the actor, uncovering it and 
suppressing it will be more difficult if the government is barred from exploring 
the actor's life by intrusive means. Cf Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 
(1965) (striking down a prohibition of the use of birth control because it would 
require a search of the marital bedroom). By contrast, actions that affect others 
are subject to discovery and prosecution on the direct testimony of those others. 
101 The holding of the Bonadio court was mischaracterized on this pomt in 
Commonwealth v. Wasson, 842 S. W.2d 487 (Ky. 1992) (purporting to follow 
Bonadio). Wasson invalidated Kentucky's prohibition of deviate sexual 
intercourse with another person of the same sex. Bonadio was also 
misinterpreted in Missouri v. Walsh, 713 S. W.2d 508, 512 (Mo. 1986) 
(purporting to decline to follow Bonadio). The Walsh court upheld a Missouri 
statute prohibiting "deviate sexual intercourse with another person of the same 
sex." !d. at 509 (quoting Mo. REV. STAT. § 566.090 (1978)). Both of these 
cases read the reliance on Mill's premise as a majority holding. 
-·. 
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better-established constitutional commitment to equality. The 
resulting majority opinion stated that the statutory exception 
allowing intercourse per os or per anus between married human 
beings caused the statute to violate equal protection. 102 
Jurisprudentially, this seems odd. A legislature trying to 
respect the marital right to privacy might rationally decide that 
enforcing a prohibition of particular combinations of body parts 
should be limited to activities outside the marital bedroom. As a 
matter of common sense, it is odder still, because if there is 
something wrong with prosecuting :Ms. Kannitz, it hardly seerns 
that the flaw rests in the fact that she could engage in exotic 
behavior on stage only if she were married to her partner. 
As a matter of judicial statesmanship, however, the approach 
in Bonadio has some redeeming features. The classic challenge to 
judicial protection of implicit rights to autonomy has always been 
that it allows judges to paralyze democracy by imposing a series 
of miniature coups d'etat. 103 Judges, it is said, oust the decisions 
of democratically elected legislatures on the basis of nothing more 
than their personal readings of moral philosophy .104 
Odd as the outcome in Bonadio seems, it avoids this criticism. 
Without entirely eliminating the legislature's power to regulate 
sexuality, the Bonadio court effectively protected not only those 
who act on stage, but those who seek personal fulfillment in 
private bedrooms as well. After Bonadio, the outcome in Bowers 
v. Hardwick105-a successful criminal prosecution of a gay man 
for sexual acts with a willing partner in his own apartment-is 
possible only in one circumstance. In order to achieve the Bowers 
result, the Pennsylvania legislature, under Bonadio, would have to 
102 Bonadio, 415 A.2d at 52 (Eagen, C.J., concurring); id. (Larsen, J., 
concurring). Logically, this proposition seems to establish that regulation of any 
nonmarital sexual activities permitted to married persons violates the Equai 
Protection Clause. 
103 See, e. g., Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment 
Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 6 (1971). 
104 !d. 
105 478 U.S. 186 (1986). The Bowers Court held that an individual's 
decision to engage in homosexual activity was not protected under the United 
States Constitution. !d. at 191-92. 
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impose the same sexual constraints on manied couples. 106 By 
taking seriously the constitutional commitment to citizens born 
"equally free and independent," the Bonadio approach provides a 
conceptual anchor outside of the personal philosophy of 
judges. 107 By linking the fate of sexual minorities to the interests 
106 See Commonwealth v. McCool, 563 A. 2d 901 , 9{)3-04 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
1989) (stating that Bonadio protects homosexuai sex acts, though not 
pornography); Commonwealth v. Thomas, 537 A.2d 9 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988) 
(holding that a conviction for deviate sexual intercourse in prison would be 
reversed on habeas); cJ. Commonwealth v. Waters , 422 A.2d 598 (Pa. Super. 
Ct. 1980) (striking down conviction for conspiracy to commit voluntary deviate 
sexual intercourse as applied to solicitation for sex). 
Pennsylvania has thus taken the lead among the few states that have 
invalidated sodomy statutes under state constitutions. See Commonwealth v. 
Wasson, 842 S. W.2d 487 (Ky. 1992) (relying on Bonadio to invalidate 
Kentucky's homosexual sodomy statute); State v. Saunders, 381 A.2d 333 (N.J. 
1977) (invalidating a fornication statute); State v. Ciuffmi, 395 A.2d 904 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1978) (invalidating sodomy statute using federal 
precedents, but also relying on Bonadio); People v . Onofre, 415 N.E.2d 936, 
941 (N.Y. 1980); cf. Schochet v . State, 580 A.2d 176 (Md. 1990) (construing 
Maryland's "Unnatural or Perverted Sexual Practices Act" in light of 
constitutional doubts, not to apply to private, noncommercial, and heterosexual 
sex acts); State v. Gray, 413 N.W.2d 107 (Minn. 1987) (upholding a sodomy 
statute as applied to commercial sex, but suggesting that private sex would be 
protected). See generally John M. Devlin, State Constitutional Autonomy Rights 
in an Age of Federal Retrenchment: Some Thoughts on the Interpretation of State 
Rights Derived from Federal Sources, 3 EMERGING ISSUES IN ST. CONST. L. 
195 (1990); JuliA. Morris, Challenging Sodomy Statutes: State Constitutional 
Protections for Sexual Privacy, 66 IND. L.J. 609 (1991); John C. Roach, 
Commonwealth v. Wasson: Invalidating Kentucky's Sodomy Statute-Rule of 
Men, 81 KY. L.J. 483, 487-93 (1993). 
107 This use of the "equally free and independent" clause to challenge 
infringements on fundamental liberty is hardly a modem innovation. James 
Madison argued against religious assessments on the basis of Virginia's cognate 
"equally free and independent" clause as follows: 
[1lhe bill violates that equality which ought to be the basis of every 
law . ... If 'all men are by nature equally free and independent,' all 
men are to be considered as entering into Society on equal conditions; 
as relinquishing no more, and therefore retaining no less, one than 
another, of their natural rights .... Whilst we assert for ourselves a 
freedom to embrace, to profess and to observe the Religion which we 
believe to be of divine origin, we cannot deny an equal freedom to 
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of traditional families, Bonadio forged a more powerful support 
than reliance on a particular philosophy of privacy could provide. 
Conversely, by casting its holding in terrns of equal protection, 
the court aliov.red the legislature to regulate sex in circumstances 
where public necessity is sufficient to persuade legislators that the 
regulation of all citizens is justified. The decision left room for the 
legis lature to participate in the ongoing debate on the future of the 
"inherent and indefeasible rights" of the citizens m the 
Commonwea!th .108 
V. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION, COMMON LAW, AND THE 
SI-IADOWS OF THE CONSTITUTION 
A. Statutory Construction 
The dialogue with the legislature need not rely on the direct 
exercise of the power of judicial review. If the Pennsylvania 
Constitution contajns recognition of an "inherent" right to privacy, 
courts can give life to that commitment by working with the 
legislature to construe existing statutes to protect individual 
privacy. 109 
those whose minds have not yet yielded to the evidence which has 
convinced us .... As the Bill violates equality by subjecting some to 
peculiar burdens; so it violates the same principle, by granting to 
others pecuiiar exemptions. 
},<\iviES MADISON, MEMORIAL AND REMONSTRANCE AGAlNST RELIGIOUS 
AssESSMENTS , reprinted in Everson v. Board of Educ . , 330 U .S. 1, 66 (1947) 
(footnotes omitted). 
108 A similar movement may be taking place in the area of child custody. 
Compare Blew v. Verta, 617 A.2d 31, 35 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992) ("where a 
parent 's homosexual relationship (or, in fact, any non-marital relationship) 
causes harm to a child in the parent's custody, the relationship may be the basis 
for restricting or limiting the custody") with Pascarella v. Pascarella, 512 A.2d 
7 15 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986) (denying custody because of a presumption that a visit 
to home where a father engaged in a homosexual relationship would be 
emotionally disturbing to children); Constant A. v. Paul C.A., 496 A.2d 1 (Pa. 
Super. Ct. 1985) (stating that moral condemnation of homosexuality is a 
legitimate basis for denying custody to a lesbian parent). 
109 Cf Boettger v. Loverro, 587. A.2d 712 (Pa. 1991) (construing the 
Pennsylvania Wiretap Act not to sanction good faith media republication of 
accidentally released wiretap transcripts in light of the First Amendment 
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This proposition reaches beyond the basic canon of statutory 
construction that stares that a statute should not be construed in a 
manner that violates the constitution. 110 It encompasses the 
independent "gravitational" force of constitutional norms. A frame 
of government committed to the protection of individual privacy 
will exert influence on an of the legal decisions made wi thin that 
framework. A court thus need not conclude that a particular 
legislative detennination would violate the constitution to hold that 
statutory ambiguities shou ld be resolved in favor of individual 
privacy. This allows the legislature to fine-tune the protections 
provided, subject to final constitutional review by the courts. 111 
protection of freedom cf the press); Hartford Accident and Indem. Co. v. 
Insurance Comm'r, 482 A.2d 542 (Pa. 1984). The Hartford court stated: 
The question presented, properly phrased, is whether the term 
' unfairly discriminatory' must be read in light of the Equal Rights 
Amendment to our Pennsylvania Constitution .... Unquestionably, 
sex discrimination in thjs Commonwealth is now unfair discrimination. 
It is a cardinal principle that ambiguous statutes should be read in a 
manner consonant with the Constitution. 
!d. at 549; see also Commonwealth v. Tate, 432 A.2d 1382 (Pa. 1981) 
(construing a defiant trespass statute in light of the constitutional commitment 
to free speech). The idea that a statute should be construed in accordance with 
a constitutional marJdate has been discussed in WILLIAM N. EsKRIDGE, JR. & 
P. FRICKEY, LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PuBLIC POLICY 
676-89 (1988); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Public Values in Statutory 
Interpretation, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 1007, 1020-22 (1989); Hiroshi Motomura, 
Immigration Law After a Century of Plenary Power: Phantom Constitutional 
Norms and Sranaory Interpretation, 100 YALE L.J. 545, 561-64 (1990); Cass 
R. Sunstein, Intel]Jreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. REV. 
405, 444-46, 459 , 468 (1989); and Cass R. Sunstein, Law and Administration 
After Chevron, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 2071, 2111-14 (1990). 
110 See 1 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1922(3) (Supp. 1993) (stating that there 
is a presumption that the legislature does not intend to violate the constitution) . 
111 Thus, in Cornmonwealth v. Tarbert, 535 A.2d 1035, 1044 (Pa. 1987), 
the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held that a roadblock stop would not violate 
Article I, Section 8 of Pennsylvania's Constitution so long as it was performed 
within appropriate systematic guidelines; the legislative authorization for vehicle 
stops upon "articulable and reasonable grounds" did render suspicionless 
roadblocks impermissible. A legislative amendment that set forth an 
authorization for systematic programs of checking vehicles "in response to the 
guidelines set forth in Tarbert" was held to appropriately authorize 
1993] PENNSYL V A.NIA 'S RJGHT TO PRIVACY 111 
Justice Linde suggested, in a recent article, that if state courts 
can resolve cases on the basis of common law or statutory 
construction, then they "need not and should not make this a 
constitutional case. " 112 The court should "leave lawmakers every 
opportunity to clarify , to amend, or to reject the court's 
understanding of the state 's policy before freezing it into 
constitutional la\v. '' 113 If Justice Linde means that courts should 
leave constitutional issues unaddressed when they are not dearly 
necessary to detennine the case, his approach seems misdirected 
on two counts. First, it incorrectly treats the state constitution as 
an entity entirely divorced from the body of law produced by 
nonconstitutional means. Second, it inaccurately seems to view 
"constitutional law" as made exciusively by the courts. 
On the first issue, particularly under a constitutional provision 
such as Pennsylvania's Article I, Section 1, which recognizes an 
extra-textual body of "inherent and indefeasible rights," the state ' s 
policy is not separate and apart from its constitution. Rather, the 
constitution is a part of a legal fabric that takes meaning from and 
sheds light upon nonconstitutional decisions. A legislator acting in 
good faith should consider the state's constitutional commitments 
when adopting legislation. A court fails its duty when it declines 
to account for similar concerns in construing that legislation. 
Indeed, because the legislature may seek to modify the judicial 
construction of a statute, the coun deprives the legislature of 
crucial infonnation if the court treats the issue as a wholly 
nonconstitutional one. 
On the second issue, to say that a statute is decided in light of 
constitutional issues that may deterrnine the outcome is not to 
nondiscriminatory roadblocks in Commonwealth v. Blouse, 611 A. 2d 1177, 
1180 (1992). Cf Commonwealth, Dep ' t of Envtl. Resources v. Blosenski 
Disposal Serv., 566 A.2d 845,851 (Pa. 1989) (Nix , C.J., dissenting) (arguing 
that the statute should not be read to authorize warrantless searches of solid 
was te disposal sites in light of Pennsylvania's search and sei:;::ure limitations); 
Commonwealth v. Lutz, 51 6 A.2d 339, 347 (Pa. 1986) (Nix, C.J., dissenting 
in part) (same). 
112 Hat1S A. Linde, Are State Constitutions Common Law?, 34 ARIZ. L. 
R EV. 215, 227 (1992). 
113 ld. 
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"freeze [the state's policy] into constitutional law. "114 On the 
contrary, if we recognize that legislators, like j udges, are under an 
obligation to "support, obey and defend the . . . Constitution of 
this Commonwealth," 115 then legislative decisions on 
constitutional issues are a part of the way that the "constitutional 
law" of the Commonwealth is made . Statutory constmction that 
invokes constitutional concerns allows the legislature to exercise 
its role in shapi11g constitutional Jaw in a way that an unvarnished 
refusal to address the constitutional issue would make impossible. 
By addressing the constitutional concern, the court offers the 
legislature both a second round of discussion \Vith the C(mrts and 
the opportunity to directly address constitutional concerns. 
This approach of construing statutes in light of the 
constitutional commitment to privacy has been adopted by the 
Pennsylvania courts in reading statutes governing the disclosure of 
the identities of rec1p1ents of welfare benefits, ns the 
Pennsylvania Wiretap Act, 117 and the statutory protections 
114 Linde supra note 112, at 227. 
11 5 PA. CONST. art. VI, § 3. 
116 McMullan v. Wohlgemuth, 308 A.2d 888, 897 (Pa. 1973) (interpreting 
a statute to prevent dissemination of names of welfare recipients because "the 
Commonwealth's interest in protecting the privacy of those it aids through 
public assistance is paramount and compelling"); Mon Valley Unemployed 
Comrn. v. Department of Pub. Welfare, 618 A.2d 1227, 1229 (Pa. Commw. 
Ct. 1992) (interpreting a statute to restrict disclosure of compilation of welfare 
liens "in order to protect the privacy rights of individuals who receive welfare 
benefits," despite the public nature of the liens individually). 
117 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 5701-5726 (Supp. 1993); see 
Commonwealth v. Hashem, 584 A.2d 1378 (Pa. 1991). The Hashem court 
stated that 
where an act is in derogation of this Commonwealth's constitutionally 
protected right to privacy its provisions must be strictly applied . ... 
If the surveillance ... is to meet the test of reasonableness [under 
Article I, Section 8], it is essential that, at a minimum, all the 
requirements directed by the Legislature be met. 
!d. at 1381 -82. Failure to request advance authorization of disclosure led to the 
suppression of evidence. !d.; see also Commonwealth v. Brachbill, 555 A.2d 
82, 90 (Pa. 1989) (construing the Pennsylvania Wiretap Act to give force to the 
constitutional commitment to "individual privacy that is the hallmark of the 
society that we are fortunate to enjoy"); Boettger v. Miklich, 599 A. 2d 713, 
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717-13 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1991) (construing the Pennsylvania ·wiretap Act to 
grant damages for the dissemination of wiretap transcripts to IRS agents, in light 
of the "'[c ]ommonweaith's constitutionally protected right to privacy"') (citation 
orilitted), appeal granted, 606 A.2d 903 (Pa. 1992); 1:j. Boettger v. Loverro, 
55S A.2d 1234 (Pa. 1989) (viewing the Pennsylvania Wiretap Act as protecting 
constitutionally guaranteed rights to reputation and privacy and constming the 
Act to impose sanctions on republication of illegally released information), 
vaC£2t<:d and renwnded on other grounds, 493 U.S. 885 (1989), and rev'd, 587 
A.2d 712 (Pa.. 1991) (constming that the Act did not punish good faith media 
republication of accidentally released wiretap transcripts in light of the First 
Amendment protection of freedom of the press). 
T1Je progenitor of this line of cases, Corr.momvcalth v. Murray, 223 A.2d 
102 (Pa. 1966) (plurality opinion), is particulariy noteworthy. In Commonwealth 
v. Chaitt, 112 A.2d 379, 380 (Pa. 1955) , the court had rejected Justice 
Musmanno' s dissenting claim that the "pursuit of happiness" protected by Article 
I , Section 1 a.t1d Article I, Section 8 protected a right to privacy that was 
infringed by official wiretapping. See id. at 385, 387. The Chaitt court seemed 
to read federal precedent as governing both state and federal constitutional 
protections. A decade later, in Murray, Justice Musmanno repeated his claims 
(in identical purple prose)-this time in a plurality opinion for the court, which 
constmed the Pennsylvania Wiretap Act of 1957 as more protective than the 
federal wiretap act. Murray, 223 A.2d at 109-10 (plurality opinion). The Murray 
court read Pennsylvania's Wiretap Act to prohibit the use of telephone 
extensions to intercept conversations in light of the "jealous regard for individual 
privacy [which] is a judicial tradition of distinguished origin, buttressed in many 
areas by the imperative mandate of constitutional guarantees." !d. at 112 
(Roberts, J., concurring). The court reached this conclusion even though the 
actual interception was performed by private detectives. See id. at 109 
(Musmanno, J., plurality opinion) (relying on Article I, Section 1 for privacy 
rights); Commonwealth v. McCoy, 275 A.2d 28, 31 (Pa. 1971) (approving 
Justice Roberts' opinion in Murray). 
In Barasch v. Bell Tel. Co., 605 A.2d 1198 (Pa. 1992), the court addressed 
the "Caller ID" technology that allows a recipient of a phone call to identify the 
number from which the call was being placed. Although the Pennsylvania 
Commonwealth Court in Barasch had held that approval of the technology by 
the Public Utilities Commission violated Pennsylvania's constitutional right to 
privacy, Barasch v. Pe1msylvania Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 576 A.2d 79 (Pa. 
Com:rnw. Ct. 1990), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that because the use 
of the technology clearly violated the Pennsylvania Wiretap Act, it was 
"unnecessary ... to reach the constitutional issues . " Barasch, 605 A.2d at 
120 1. This statement is best read as a commentary on the clariDJ of the statutory 
issue, rather than an abandonment of the practice of construing the Act in light 
of Pennsylvania's CO!Th."llitment to privacy. 
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accorded to the re-Cords of patients. who consuit health 
professionals. 118 The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania will have 
an opportunity to address similar issues in a pending case that 
raises the question of what constitutes a "compelling need" for 
disclosure of HIV status under Pennsylvania ' s Confidentiality of 
HlV-Related Information Act. 119 
11 8 O'Don.11ell v. United States , 891 F.2d 1079, 1086 (3d Cir. 1989) 
(construing the Mental Health Procedures Act to provide action for the failure 
to protect psychiatric confidentiaiity in light of Pennsylvania's constitutional 
commitment to privacy); Commonwealth v. Wilson , 602 A.2d 1290 (Pa. 1992) 
(stating that in light of privacy concerns, a statutory privilege for rape 
counselors is construed to protect records from discovery by a rape defendant); 
Commonwealth v. Moore, 584 A.2d 936 (Pa. 1991) (interpreting the 
confidentiality requirements of the Disease Prevention and Control Act strictly 
to preclude discovery by the prosecution of a rape defendant's records of 
treatment); Cornmonwealth v. Kyle, 533 A.2d 120, 127 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987) 
(construing broadly the statutory psychologist-patient privilege to encompass 
records in light of the constitutional commitment to privacy), appeal denied, 541 
A.2d 744 (Pa. 1988), cited with approval in Wilson, 602 A.2d at 1295; 
Sanderson v. Bryan, 522 A.2d 1138, 1142 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987) (construing 
narrowly an exception to the Peer Review Protection Act in order to protect 
personal medical records in light of the constitutional right to privacy in personal 
matters). 
In this context, the court's decision in Commonwealth v. Lloyd, 567 A.2d 
1357 (Pa. 1989) , holding that a defendant is entitled to discovery of the 
psychotherapeutic records of a six-year old girl he allegedly raped, is somewhat 
puzzling. In Wilson, the court distinguishedLloyd stating that it "did not involve 
a statutory privilege." Wilson, 602 A.2d at 1297. However, the Wilson court 
recognized that Kyle established an "absolute," "statutory privilege" for 
psychologist-patient communications. !d. at 1295. Justice Larsen's dissent in 
Lloyd explicitly invoked Kyle. Lloyd, 567 A.2d at 1365 (Larsen, J., dissenting). 
119 35 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 7601-7612 (1993); see In re Milton S. 
Hershey Medical Ctr., 595 A.2d 1290 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991), appeal granted, 
611 A.2d 712 (Pa. 1992). In Hershey, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania 
approved the grant of an order for the dissemination of information to patients 
and health care workers concerning the illY -positive status of an obstetric 
resident. !d. at 1293-94. The "compelling need" required by the statute was 
found first in the necessity of informing patients of "their potential exposure to 
I-IIV and to offer them treatment, testing and counseling," and second in the 
need "to protect the other health professionals from stigmatism and to alleviate 
any 'mass hysteria."' !d. at 1293. Given the court's constitutional concern in 
Stenger v. Lehigh Valley Hosp. Ctr., 609 A.2d 796 (Pa. 1992) for minimizing 
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B. The Comnzon Law 
The development of the common law raises somewhat different 
concerns. Courts developing the common law initially act alone. 
Thus, reference to constitutional concerns in developing common 
law do not initially promote constitutional dialogue between the 
branches of government. Unlike the sih1ation in the federal courts, 
no special authorization is necessary for state courts to develop 
common-law mles in the interest of public policy. Therefore, one 
might argue that explicitly adverting to the constitutional 
commitment to privacy adds nothing to the analysis of a case when 
courts have protected privacy at common law. no 
Two aspects, however, make the constitutional commitment to 
privacy important to common-law development. First, where state 
statutes have immunized government or other parties from 
common-law obligations, a constitutionally based doctrine can 
allow courts to provide relief. Although sovereign immunity may 
shield a Pennsylvania governmental entity from a strictly common-
law cause of action, 121 a common-law doctrine that develops as 
part of a constitutional commitment to privacy would establish, at 
a minimum, that public policy does not shield the individual state 
official from claims for redress. 122 
the disclosure of HIV information, the decision of the lower court to allow 
identification of the professional capacity of the doctor in question, as a way of 
avoiding "stigmatism" of his colleagues, seems dubious. 
12° Cf Kevin L. Cole, Federal and State "State Action": The Undercritical 
Embrace of a Hypercriticized Doctrine, 24 GA. L. REV. 327, 371 (1990) 
("almost all state constitutional claims can be translated into nonconstitutional 
state claims"). 
121 See, e.g., Garrettson v. Pennsylvania Liquor Control Bd., 405 A.2d 1146 
(Pa. Commw. Ct. 1979) (invoking sovereign immunity from an invasion of 
privacy suit based on the use of a plaintiff's picture on the cover of state store 
price list). 
122 Cf. Picariello v. Commonwealth, Dep't of Revenue, 421 A.2d 477 (Pa. 
Commw. Ct. 1980) (stating that the Commonwealth was immune from an 
invasion of privacy claim, and statin.g that official's individual immunity should 
be determined by whether public policy would be promoted by a shield of 
immunity). 
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Second , and more important, courts, HJ<:e legislatures, have an 
obligation to support and defend the constitutional comm.itments of 
the Commonwealth. To ignore those commitments in the 
fommlation of common law is to tnmcate the analysis of public 
policy. 123 
The effort to protect piivacy may often conflict with 
precedent or standard doctrines elsewhere in the law. Although it 
is always oven to a court to declare that the standard commitment 
- .1 
is against public policy, courts must root that public policy 
decision in a source of law more 'Neighty than thr::ir mvn 
inclinations in the case before them . The common law does not 
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A recognized constitutional value can provide tbe requisite 
grounding. The gravitational force of the constitutional 
commitment may thus alter the common-law doctrine in a way 
anaiogous to the resolution of a statutory case. 
In the employment context, for example, the general principle 
that employees are terminable-at-will has been held to be limited 
by Pennsylvania's constitutional commitment to the availability of 
jury trials 124 and to freedom of speech in the political 
process. 125 A similar result should flow from Pennsylvania's 
123 The concept of the common law and the constitution as enmeshed in a 
single fabric is hardly a new one. See Ellen A. Peters, Common Law 
Amecedents of Constitutional Law in Connecticut, in TOWARD A UsABLE PAST: 
LIBERTY UNDER STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 189 (Paul Fin.."'<:elman & Steven 
E . Gottlieb eds., 1991); William M. Wiecek, State Prorection of Personal 
Liberty: Remembering the Future, in TowARD A USABLE PAST, supra, 371, 
372; Ellen A. Peters, Federalism in the Law: State Constitutional Common Law 
Tradition, 84 MICH. L. REV . 583 (1986). 
124 Reuther v . Fowler & Williams, Inc., 386 A.2d 119 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
1978). 
125 Novosel v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 721 F .2d 894 (3d Cir. 1983). Courts 
have also declined to provide wrongful discharge actions based on other 
provisions of the Pennsylvania Constitution. Booth v . McDonneil Douglas Tmck 
Servs., Inc., 585 A .2d 24 (Pa. Super. Ct.) (analyzing a claim of impai nnent of 
obligation of contract), appeal denied, 597 A.2d 1150 CPa. 1991) ; Veno v. 
Meredith, 515 A.2d 571 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986) (claiming a vioiationofthe right 
to free speech) ; Martin v. Capital Cities Media, Inc. , 5 11 A.2d 830 (Pa. Super. 
Ct. 1980) (claiming a violation of the right to free speech). 
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constitutional commitment to privacy. 
On a parallel issue, the Supreme Court of New Jersey in 
Hennessey v. Coastal Eagle Point Oil Co., 126 recently relied on 
the right to privacy under New Jersey's analogous "natura! and 
unalienable rights'' clause. 127 The court found that public policy 
considerations in New Jersey would pem1it a common-law cause 
of action for wrongful discharge in the case of random urine 
testing by an employer. 128 
The pitfalls of a contrary approach that seeks to avoid 
constitutional discourse 1n cornmon-law decisionmaking are 
illustrated bv the Third Circuit's decision in Borse v. Piece Goods 
J 
Shop, Inc., 129 -..:v hich sought to predict the course Pennsylvania' s 
law. In Borse, the court declined to ground a cause of action for 
wrongful discharge in the constitutional commitments to privacy 
rooted in Article I, Section 1 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. 130 
Yet, Borse recognized a cause of action for discharges resulting 
from abusive drug testing rooted in the "policy" of common law 
privacy rights in Pennsylvania. 131 In many ways, this approach 
mirrors the defects of Justice Linde's analysis of statutory 
construction. 132 The Borse decision failed to acknowledge that 
the law of Pennsylvania is not divided into sealed categories of 
constitutional law and common law, but rather is part of a single 
fabric. The artificiality of this bifurcation between constitutional 
policy and common-law policy was highlighted when the Third 
1989), the court found that a claim for sexual hamssment rooted in the policies 
of Pennsylvania's Equal Rights Amendment, was barred by the exclusivity of 
the remedies under the Pennsyiva.11ia Human Relations Act. /d. at 921; see 43 
PA. CoNS. STAT. ANN. §§ 951-963 (1991 and Supp. 1993); see also PA. 
CONST. art. I, § 28 (for the text of Pennsylvania's Equal Rights Amendment). 
Chief Justice Nix concurred, suggesting that no wrongful discharge cause of 
action was available. Clay, 559 A.2d at 922 (Nix, C.J., concurring). 
126 609 A.2d 11 (N.J. 1992). 
127 N.J. CONST. art. I, para. 1. 
12s Hennessey, 609 A.2d at 19. 
129 963 F.2d 611 (3d Cir.), reh'g denied, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 15100 (3d 
Cir. 1992) (en bane) . The Borse case antedated the Hennessey decision. 
130 !d. at 620. 
!31 !d. 
132 See supra notes 112-19 and accompanying text. 
.J 
1 
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Circuit found itself drawn to rely on search and seizure precedents 
to establish that urine testing impinges on the "'expectations of 
privacy that society has long recognized as reasonable.'" 133 
V1" CONCLUSION 
At the dose of the seventeenth century, having framed a 
charter for a new colony, William Penn wrote: "[T]hey that must 
be enjoy' d by every Body, can never enjoy themselves as they 
should .... It is the Advantage little Men have upon them; they 
can be private .. . ['.vhich is] the greatest Worldly Contents lv1en 
can enjoy." 134 It is only fitting, three centuries later, that the 
courts of Pennsylvania, in constming the inheritance of Penn's 
charter, have undertaken to preserve that right to "be private ." 
Pennsylvania's courts should feel no compunction about diverging 
from the conclusions of their federal brethren in this endeavor, 
bound as they are by a distinctive tradition and a different 
constitutional text. As it gives life to that heritage, Pennsylvania's 
emerging right to privacy will become an important fixture of the 
Commonwealth's jurisprudence. As it binds together constitutional 
text, inherent and indefeasible rights , statutes, and common law, 
133 Borse, 963 F.2d at 621 (quoting Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives ' 
Ass'n , 489 U.S. 602, 617 (1989)). The Pennsylvania Superior Court, in 
Hershberger v. New Jersey Shore Steel Co., 575 A.2d 944 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
1990), appeal denied, 589 A.2d 691 (Pa. 1991), denied a cause of action for a 
discharge based on a urinalysis performed without confirmatory testing. It did 
not explicitly address the question of the possible privacy violation. Jd. 
The approach suggested in the text was adopted by the court in Bonacci v. 
Save Our Unborn Lives, Inc., 2 Phila. County Rptr. 643, 11 D. & C.3d 259 
(1979), in which the common pleas court found a cause of action against a 
spurious abortion clinic that disclosed to a young woman's parents her desire to 
obtain an abortion. Reasoning that the woman had confided the information to 
the clinic on its representation that it was a medical provider, the court relied 
on Pennsylvania's constitutional commitment to medical privacy in In reB., 394 
A.2d 419 (Pa. 1978) , to fmd that the spurious clinic owed a common-law duPJ 
of confidentiality. Cf Dunkle v. Tindal, 582 A.2d 1342 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990) 
(refusing to obligate a physician to notify persons who may be banned by her 
patients because of the constitutionally recognized importance of medical 
confidentiality). 
134 WILLIAM PENN, SOME FRUITS OF SOLITUDE 96-97 (8th ed. 1749). 
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the right to p1ivacy will constitute a needed bulwark against the 
threats of the twenty-first century. 
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